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Emerging Trends in California
Jurisprudence: The First Three Years of
the Sixth District Court of Appeal
Russell J. Hanlon*
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
On November 19, 1984, the Sixth District Court of Appeal of the
State of California opened its doors in downtown San Jose to entertain
and decide appeals and writ petitions. The Sixth District was carved
out of the First District Court of Appeal to review cases which were
generated from four counties: Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Monterey
and San Benito.
The three original justices appointed to the new court came from
the three largest counties within the Sixth District. Justice Edward A.
Panelli assumed the Presiding Justice position on September 13, 1984.1
He had served as a Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge from
March 17, 1972, to October 3, 1983, and as an Associate Justice on
the First District Court of Appeal from October 3, 1983, until
September 13, 1984.2 Justice Nat A. Agliano became an Associate
Justice on November 2, 1984. 3 He had been a Monterey County
Municipal Court Judge from October 1, 1971, to March 15, 1972,
and a Monterey County Superior Court Judge from March 16, 1972,
* Appellate attorney, Berliner, Cohen & Biagini, San Jose, California; Member, Cali-
fornia Bar; J.D., Yale Law School, 1982; B.A., University of Michigan, 1974.
1. K. ARNom, CALuoRmA CouRTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 423 (5th ed. 1988).
2. Id. at 423-24.
3. Id. at 119.
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until November 2, 1984. 4 Justice Harry F. Brauer also assumed the
office of Associate Justice on November 2, 1984.- He had considerable
judicial experience, beginning with his service as a Santa Cruz County
Municipal Court Judge from January 2, 1962, to January 2, 1973,
and continuing with his service as a Santa Cruz County Superior
Court Judge from January 2, 1973, until November 2, 1984.6
A little over a year after the court began to operate, the Sixth
District experienced its first change in personnel. On December 24,
1985, Justice Panelli was elevated to an Associate Justice position on
the California Supreme Court.7 Thereafter, Justice Agliano took over
as Presiding Justice." Despite the vacancy, the court had to operate
for ten months without a permanent third justice. Superior court
judges filled the void through temporary assignments by the Chair-
person of the Judicial Council. On October 24, 1986, Justice Walter
P. Capaccioli assumed the duties of an Associate Justice with the
court.9 Justice Capaccioli had served as a San Mateo County Munic-
ipal Court Judge from January 20, 1971, to January 7, 1974, and as
a San Mateo County Superior Court Judge from January 7, 1974,
until October 24, 1986.10
From its inception, the court struggled with the problem of an
excessive caseload. The Administrative Office of the Courts even
concluded that the Sixth District needed eight justices to handle the
caseload produced by the superior courts in its four counties." This
need was not satisfied until recently. Instead, the overload situation
steadily worsened. Whereas the court had 293 civil and criminal
appeals pending as of June 30, 1985, it had a total of 557 appeals
pending as of June 30, 1986, and 726 appeals pending as of June 30,
1987.12 Between July 1, 1985, and June 30, 1987, over 60 appeals
were filed each month in the superior courts within the Sixth District
and 34 writ petitions per month were filed with the court." As of
4. Id.
5. Id. at 158.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 423.
8. Id. at 119.
9. Id. at 177.
10. Id.
11. Hon. N. Agliano, The Sixth District-Status, INDEPENDENT ADvoc. J., November 3,
1986, at 14, col. I.
12. JUDiciAL CouNcu. OF CuAroRNiA, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, 95, Table T-15; JtDIcLAL
CouEcu oF CmoHoRN, 1988 ANNUAL REPo1r, 61, Table T-21.
13. For the first full two years for which figures are available, the court received 750
civil and criminal appeals and 406 writ petitions between July 1, 1985 and June 30, 1986 and
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June 30, 1987, in the typical civil appeal, ten months passed between
the date on which briefing was deemed to be completed and the date
on which the opinion was filed.
14
The Sixth District Justices worked intensively to meet the challenge
posed by the increasing backlog. According to the most recent figures
available, the Court of Appeal in San Jose is the most productive
court among the six district courts of appeal. For the year ending
June 30, 1987, the Sixth District decided 147 appeals and writ petitions
by majority opinion per justice, the highest rate in the state and 26
percent higher than the statewide average of 117 per justice. 15 During
the same time period, the Sixth District disposed of 400 appeals and
writ petitions, with and without opinion, per justice, 27 percent more
than the second highest ratio (in the Fourth District) and 57 percent
higher than the statewide average of 255 per justice.16
It appears that the Sixth District Justices may no longer have to
watch their backlog increase, even as they lead the state in produc-
tivity. They recently received relief through the appointment of three
new justices to the court. Santa Cruz County Superior Court Judge
Christopher C. Cottle and Santa Clara County Superior Court Judges
Franklin D. Ella and Eugene M. Premo joined the court in October
1988. Both the bench and the bar eagerly await the contributions of
the three new justices to California law.
II. GENERAL TRENDs iN Civn. CASEs
In its first three full years of issuing decisions (1985-1987), the Sixth
District published over 100 opinions in civil appeals and original civil
proceedings. In this article, the general philosophy and trends which
emerge from the court's published civil cases for the years 1985
through 1987 will be discussed. Also, the article will focus on cases
in which the court either broke new ground or disagreed with a ruling
of another district court of appeal. Finally, the reasoning in the
court's most significant cases will be analyzed. Both scholars and
a total of 727 appeals and 413 writ petitions between July 1, 1986 and June 30, 1987. JuDicIAL
CouNcEl oF CAnFoRmA, 1988 ANNuAL REPORT, 164, Table A-3. The 380 filings per justice
for the year ending June 30, 1987 was 43% higher than the second highest filings per justice
ratio (in the Fourth District) and 75% higher than the statewide average ratio of 217 per
justice. Id. at 34, Figure 3.
14. Id. at 64, Table T-23.
15. Id. at 35, Figure 5.
16. Id. at 35, Figure 4.
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practitioners should benefit from getting acquainted with the court's
approach to deciding cases.
As Republican Governor George Deukmejian appointed all of the
Justices to the Sixth District, the conventional wisdom was that the
court would issue conservative-perhaps very conservative-opinions.
Overall, the court's approach to civil cases seems guided by a con-
servative judicial philosophy, but not necessarily a conservative polit-
ical philosophy. Results are usually predictable, if not flamboyant.
The court's decisions in civil cases have produced several notable
trends. Perhaps the most significant trend is that the Sixth District
frequently interprets statutes in a strict manner, even if the result is
harsh. The court seems mindful of the maxim that "tough cases make
bad law." In the words of Justice Brauer:
This court is disinclined to make new law, confident that such a
role is best played by the entity to which the Constitution assigned
it. We are even less inclined to make bad law.17
The court refrains from exercising judicial creativity in formulating
exceptions to statutes. Similarly, the court is reluctant to create new
causes of action or to expand the reach of the law so as to confer
the right to bring an action in a novel situation.
This cautious approach is especially noticeable in the court's deci-
sions in the areas of torts,1 8 employment law, 9 and landlord-tenant
relations. 20 However, the court demonstrates that its decisions are not
predicated on ideology in the areas of real property, 21 environmental, 22
and consumer law;23 it frequently rules against large institutions and
developers in its published decisions.
In other areas of law, such as constitutional law2A and legal
ethics,2 the court has published significant decisions, but its few
published opinions have yielded no general trends to date. The bar
should take note of some of the court's important decisions regarding
civil procedure,2 as well as appellate procedure and jurisdiction.27
17. Alcott v. M. E. V. Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 797, 801, 238 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1987).
18. See infra notes 29-112 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 113-207 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 246-268 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 208-245 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 269-299 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 300-313 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 314-331 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 332-344 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 345-353 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 354-364 and accompanying text.
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Finally, like all appellate courts, the Sixth District has frequently
announced and defined the standards of review that apply in particular
types of cases.z
III. TORT LAW TRENDS
A. Strict Interpretation of Time Limits for Filing Tort Claims
The Sixth District refuses to come to the aid of a sympathetic
plaintiff who has not timely pursued available remedies. For example,
in Aronson v. Superior Court,29 a minor brought a medical malpractice
action against a doctor and a university for negligently providing
prenatal and delivery care. Applying the shortened statute of limita-
tions in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) that
took effect after the minor's injuries occurred, the court of appeal
issued a writ directing the trial court to sustain the defendants'
demurrers, even though the minor had suffered brain injuries which
caused total paralysis and an inability to speakA0 The court recognized
that retroactive application of a shortened statute of limitations may
violate due process where the new statute leaves a particular party
with little or no time to file suit. However, the court ruled that the
plaintiff's action was barred because the action had not been filed
within the limitations period set forth in California Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.5. 31 The amount of time within which the minor
had to bring suit after MICRA became effective-four years-was
considered reasonable.12 Undoubtedly, the court chose to make a
tough decision which produced the harsh result of cutting off a
severely injured minor's cause of action, rather than make, from its
point of view, "bad law"-the arguable result if the court had created
an exception to the legislative scheme.
In DeRose v. Carswell,33 the court affirmed a judgment in favor
of the defendant after a demurrer had been sustained, based upon a
statute of limitations defense.4 DeRose was an action by an adult
28. See infra notes 365-406 and accompanying text.
29. 191 Cal. App. 3d 294, 236 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1987).
30. Aronson, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
31. CAL. Cxv. PRoc. CODE § 340.5 (Vest 1982) (the new MICRA statute of limitations).
32. Aronson, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 297, 300, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
33. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987).
34. Id. at 1015, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70.
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against her step-grandparent to recover damages for the injuries which
she had suffered because the step-grandparent allegedly had sexually
abused her as a child between thirteen and twenty years earlier. The
court specifically declined the plaintiff's invitation to apply the delayed
discovery doctrine. Under that doctrine, as the court explained, a
limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff is aware
of, or reasonably should have discovered, all facts essential to a
particular cause of action. 5 Based upon the assumption that a sexual
assault causes immediate serious harm as a matter of law, the court
concluded that the allegations in the DeRose complaint showed that
the plaintiff had long been aware of all facts necessary to plead a
cause of action for assault against her step-grandparent. 6 Thus, the
resulting immediate harm gave the plaintiff a right to sue at the time
the assaults occurred.3 7 The court observed that the plaintiff could
have invoked the delayed discovery doctrine if she had pleaded that
she had repressed her memories of the sexual assaults until a date no
earlier than twelve months before she had filed her complaint.38 The
plaintiff did not plead any repression, but instead, alleged that psy-
chological processes had prevented her from recognizing any harm
from the assaults or the causal relationship between the assaults and
the harm. Nevertheless, the court rejected her argument and held that
she could not benefit from the delayed discovery rule. 39
The court's conclusion was justifiable only if one indulges in the
assumption that a sexual assault on a child causes immediate harm
as a matter of law. That assumption does not seem warranted in
every case. Although a sexual assault on a child is a horrible act in
the eyes of an adult, the victim, like DeRose, may not immediately
appreciate the full extent of the harm or the link between the misdeed
and the harm. Clinical studies reveal that many women who have
been sexually abused as children sustain psychological injuries which
remain latent until adulthood.40 If the victim is not aware of her
35. DeRose, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
36. Id. at 1017-18, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
37. Id. at 1017, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
38. Id. at 1018, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
39. Id. at 1018-19, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
40. See, e.g., M. Tsai, S. Feldman-Summers & M. Edgar, Childhood Molestation:
Variables Relating to Differential Impacts on Psychosexual Functioning in Adult Women, 88
J. oF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 407, 413-14 (1979) (finding that women who had been sexually
molested as children, as a group, were significantly less well adjusted and significantly less
satisfied with their psychosexual functioning as adults compared to women who had never
been molested). See also Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the
Victim's Remedies, 7 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 189, 199-202 (1984) (describing psychosexual and
emotional injuries suffered by female victims of incest that are not manfested until adulthood).
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injury or the fact that the sexual assault caused her injury, then she
is not aware of all facts essential to the cause of action for assault.
Consequently, without the court's assumption regarding immediate
harm, DeRose seemed to qualify for application of the delayed
discovery doctrine. Given that the court of appeal reviewed the case
at the demurrer stage, the better course would have been to allow
the plaintiff to try to prove her case, rather than bar the plaintiff's
action based upon an assumption which is not applicable in every
case. If DeRose filed her action more than one year after she became
aware of her emotional harm and the cause of that harm, her action
would be barred by California Code of Civil Procedure section
340(3). 41 This factual issue is a matter of proof, not pleading.
In DeRose, the Sixth District also announced its vigorous opposition
to the judicial trend whereby a party may avoid the bar of a statute
of limitations by splitting a cause of action in a case where a
defendant's act caused both small immediate harm and severe sub-
sequent harm.4 2 In DeRose, the plaintiff argued that she could state
a separate cause of action as a result of the subsequent emotional
harm, even if the statute of limitations barred her action to recover
for the harm immediately caused by the assaults. The plaintiff relied
upon the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Zambrano
v. Dorough.
43
In Zambrano, the plaintiff suffered immediate physical injury and
distress as a result of a doctor's misdiagnosis and treatment and was
forced thirty months later to undergo a complete hysterectomy as a
result of the same medical malpractice. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that the plaintiff could pursue an action against the
doctor for the loss of her reproductive capacity because that injury
was different from the physical injury and emotional distress which
she had originally suffered. 44 Although noting that the traditional
view precludes a plaintiff from splitting a cause of action, the Fourth
District decided to follow the trend which allows the splitting of a
cause of action in the interests of justice.45 In doing so, the court
relied upon the Second District decision in Martinez-Ferrer v. Ri-
chardson-Merrell, Inc.46
41. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (Vest 1982 & Supp. 1989).
42. DeRose, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 374. See also infra notes 43-57
and accompanying text (discussing this judicial trend).
43. 179 Cal. App. 3d 169, 224 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1986).
44. Zambrano, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
45. Id. at 173, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
46. 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980).
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In Martinez-Ferrer, the plaintiff, after taking an anti-cholesterol
drug for a period of time, soon developed an allergic reaction in his
eyes and a rash over his entire body and was forced to miss work
for several weeks. Sixteen years later, he also developed cataracts in
his eyes as a result of his ingestion of the drug. The Second District
Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could sue the drug manufac-
turer for the injuries which he sustained sixteen years after he had
stopped taking the drug, even though he obviously sustained substan-
tial damages from the initial injuries. 47 In explaining its refusal to
apply the rule against splitting causes of action, the court reasoned:
These developments [in the law] ... certainly are straws which
indicate which way the wind is blowing: away from a blind adherence
to rigid concepts of what constitutes a cause of action and toward
a set of rules which will enable plaintiffs to recover for just claims
where that is possible without prejudice to defendants or insult to
established rules of laws .... We make no attempt to even sum-
marize where all this may lead. We are, however, convinced that
under the peculiar circumstances of this case it would be a miscarriage
of justice not to permit plaintiff to go to trial.4
In his majority opinion in DeRose, Justice Brauer concluded that
the answer was not blowing in the wind. Justice Brauer pointed to
the rule established by the supreme court in Davies v. Krasna,49 which
provides that a limitations period does not start to run until the
occurrence of all events which entitle a plaintiff to a true legal remedy,
as opposed to a mere symbolic judgment for nominal damages. 0
Justice Brauer concluded that the Zambrano decision did not properly
apply the Davies rule because the plaintiffs earlier injuries in Zam-
brano were serious, not minor." He also noted that the Zambrano
decision did not need to avoid the rule against splitting causes of
action because the court had found that the earlier and subsequent
injuries to the plaintiff's reproductive system involved invasions of
different primary rights and thus, the plaintiff could state two dif-
ferent causes of action without regard to the rule.
52
In DeRose, Justice Brauer also criticized the "assault" on the rule
against splitting a cause of action by the Martinez-Ferrer court because
47. Martinez-Ferrer, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 325-27, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
48. Id. at 327, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
49. 14 Cal. 3d 502, 535 P.2d 1161, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975).
50. Davies, 14 Cal. 3d at 513, 535 P.2d at 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
51. DeRose, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1023, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
52. Id. at 1023-24, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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the plaintiff in that case was entitled, under Davies, to recover
damages for the cataracts injuries after experiencing, much earlier, a
short-lived rash.53 He concluded his analysis by stating that the
Martinez-Ferrer result was compatible with Davies, but the Zambrano
result was inconsistent with Davies; also, Zambrano did not justifiably
extend the Davies rule that nominal harm does not start the running
of a limitations period.54 The statutory period begins to run, under
Davies, upon the infliction of any actual and appreciable harm, and
the plaintiff in Zambrano suffered such harm at the time of the
tortious act. 55
If the essence of a cause of action is the injury rather than the
wrongful act, Justice Brauer's evaluation of Zambrano was correct,
insofar as he stated that the Zambrano court did not need to come
within any exception to the rule against splitting a cause of action.
The Zambrano plaintiff suffered two distinct harms and could have
properly pleaded two separate causes of action, even though both
resulted from the same wrongful act and were separate in time. The
same analysis could apply to the Martinez-Ferrer decision. For that
matter, the court's rejection of the plaintiff's position in DeRose is
mysterious in that the plaintiff alleged that she suffered immediate
physical harm (barred, for the sake of argument, by the statute of
limitations) and subsequent emotional harm as a result of the sexual
assaults. Thus, the plaintiff properly stated separate causes of action
for assault and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Whether
or not she timely commenced that action should have be resolved by
evidence, rather than allegations.
On a separate matter, Justice Brauer incorrectly concluded that the
Martinez-Ferrer result fell squarely within the Davies rule. In Marti-
nez-Ferrer, the court of appeal expressly rejected the plaintiff's ar-
gument that his earlier injuries were so minor that they did not result
in the accrual of any cause of action. The court found that the
plaintiff had suffered a substantial amount of damages, including a
considerable loss of earnings. 56 Indeed, the court made that determi-
nation immediately after its discussion of the Davies case.57 Thus, the
53. Id. at 1023-25, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
54. Id. at 1025, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
55. Id. at 1022-23, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. See also Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502,
514, 535 P.2d 1161, 1169, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 713; Zambrano v. Dorough, 179 Cal. App. 3d
169, 172, 224 Cal. Rptr. 323, 324-25.
56. Martinez-Ferrer, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
57. Id.
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Martinez-Ferrer court believed that it was extending, not merely
following, Davies.
In the final analysis, the Second and Fourth District Courts of
Appeal have indicated that circumstances can justify an exception to
the rule against splitting a cause of action. The Sixth District disagrees.
It will not extend the law beyond the Davies rule. However, the Sixth
District recognizes that two injuries, separate in time and resulting
from one wrongful act, can produce two distinct causes of action.
The corollary of that principle is that an action to recover for the
subsequent injuries may be timely, by virtue of the delayed discovery
doctrine, even if the applicable limitations period has passed from
the date of the wrongful act and the immediate injury.
In a third tort case involving the construction of a statute which
imposed a filing deadline, a county had rejected a petition to allow
the presentation of an untimely tort claim where more than one year
had passed from the date that the petitioner had notice of the claim
as a result of service of a third party's personal injury complaint on
the petitioner. 58 The Sixth District held, in Greyhound Lines Inc. v.
County of Santa Clara59 that the petition was untimely under Cali-
fornia Government Code section 911.4,60 even though the petitioner
did not discover the facts indicating the county's potential liability to
the third party for medical malpractice until after the one-year period
had expired. 61 The result, although correct in view of the authorities
cited by the court, was harsh because it allowed the aggravation of
the plaintiff's injuries, resulting from the alleged medical malpractice
of a county doctor, to go uncompensated. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Brauer agreed that the result was unjust, but emphasized that
the legislature, rather than the courts, should create a "late discovery"
exception to the time limitations for filing government tort claims
with public entities.62
These three tort cases show that the Sixth District will strictly
construe and apply a statute which limits the right to bring an action,
even if the result leaves a severely injured plaintiff without a remedy.
63
58. Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. App. 3d 480, 231 Cal. Rptr. 702
(1986).
59. Id.
60. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 911.4 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Section 911.4 requires the filing
of an application for leave to present an untimely tort claim with a governmental entity within
one year of the accrual of the claim. Id. § 911.4(b).
61. Greyhound, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487-88, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (1986).
62. Id. at 488, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 706, (Brauer, J. concurring).
63. See also Marquez-Luque v. Marquez, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1516-17, 238 Cal. Rptr.
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While the court's approach to statutory construction operates to
extinguish rights of injured parties, its interpretation of the "consumer
expectation" test makes recovery relatively easy in a strict liability
action.
B. The Court Adopts a Liberal Version of the Consumer
Expectation Test in Strict Liability Cases
In a strict product liability action, must the circumstances surround-
ing the use of the product-or the product itself-be a matter of
common experience to allow a plaintiff to establish, without expert
testimony, a design defect with evidence that the product failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect? Disagreeing
with the First District Court of Appeal, the Sixth District holds that
the consumer expectation test can apply so long as the use of the
product is within the realm of common experience.6
4
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,65 the California Supreme Court
articulated the consumer expectation test as follows:
[Al product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner. 6
In Campbell v. General Motors Corp. ,67 the supreme court stated the
standards for a prima facie case of design defect under the consumer
expectation test in the following terms:
[I]f the product is one within the common experience of ordinary
consumers, it is generally sufficient if the plaintiff provides evidence
concerning (1) his or her use of the product; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the injury; and (3) the objective features of the product
which are relevant to an evaluation of its safety.A
172, 175 (1987) (holding that Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, which authorizes the
issuance of an injunction to enjoin civil harassment, did not allow the trial court to evict a
beneficiary of an estate from the decedent's home, even though the beneficiary had threatened
to kill his sister and bum the house down if she took the house away from him through
probate proceedings).
64. Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 648-51, 219 Cal.Rptr. 513, 521-24 (1985).
Accord, West v. Johnson & Johnson Products Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 864-67, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 437, 457-58 (1985), cert. den., 479 U.S. 824 (1986).
65. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
66. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 (1978).
67. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
68. Campbell, 32 Cal. 3d at 127, 649 P.2d at 233, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
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In Campbell, the plaintiff was injured on a bus manufactured by
the defendant when thrown to the floor as the bus made a sharp
turn. The court held that the plaintiff satisfied the test with proof
that the absence of a restraining pole or bar within her reach did not
meet ordinary consumer safety expectations and caused her injury. 69
In Lunghi v. Clark Equipment Co.,70 the First District considered
a request to apply the consumer expectation test. That case involved
a wrongful death action to recover on behalf of a worker who was
crushed by a falling boom and bucket of a Bobcat front-end loader
manufactured by the defendant. The accident had occurred when the
loader was at rest with the engine turned off. The court of appeal
upheld the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction based upon
the consumer expectation test where the plaintiff had presented no
expert testimony.71 The appellate court concluded that an ordinary
consumer was not a user of a loader and thus, would not know
whether the boom and the bucket could fall with fatal force, even
when the engine of the loader was turned off.72 Therefore, the First
District refused to apply the consumer expectation test where an
ordinary consumer would lack familiarity with the product whose
design was allegedly defective. In Bates v. John Deere Co.,71 the First
District again refused to apply the consumer expectation test on the
ground that the allegedly defective product-a cotton picking ma-
chine-was outside the realm of the ordinary consumer's experience. 74
The Sixth District has fashioned a more liberal version of the
consumer expectation test. In Akers v. Kelley Co.,75 the plaintiff was
severely injured when a 700 pound steel truck-loading platform flew
apart and a piece of it struck him in the head. The court of appeal
held that the case was appropriate for an application of the consumer
expectation test because any juror with no prior experience with
loading platforms could conclude that the platform involved in that
case had failed to meet consumer expectations regarding safety.76
Explaining its disagreement with the First District's decisions in Lunghi
and Bates, the Sixth District refused to construe the supreme court's
69. Id. at 127, 649 P.2d at 233, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
70. 153 Cal. App. 3d 485, 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1984).
71. Lunghi, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
72. Id. (citing Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 127, 649 P.2d 224,
233, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 900 (1982)).
73. 148 Cal. App. 3d 40, 195 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1983).
74. Bates, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 52, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
75. 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1985).
76. Akers, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
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above-quoted statement in Campbell to mean that the test is inappli-
cable where the ordinary consumer would lack experience with the
product at issue. 77 Instead, the Sixth District interpreted Campbell to
hold only that the plaintiff could and did establish, without expert
testimony, a prima facie case of the failure of the bus design to meet
consumer expectations regarding safety because public transportation
was a matter of common experience.
78
In West v. Johnson & Johnson Products Inc.,79 the Sixth District
reiterated its analysis of the consumer expectation test, as weli as its
disagreement with the First District. 0 The court stated that the test
can be applied even if expert testimony has been introduced at trial,
suggesting that the First District believed otherwise.
81 Also, the court
held that the consumer expectation test was applicable in an action
to recover damages for toxic shock syndrome resulting from the use
of a tampon manufactured by the defendant, where the plaintiff had
the right to expect that use of the product would not cause severe
injury. 8
2
In rebuttal, the First District has objected to the Sixth District's
criticism of its views regarding the consumer expectation test. In
Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,
8 the First
District disagreed that its Lunghi and Bates decisions involved a
refusal to utilize the consumer expectation test where an ordinary
consumer would lack experience with the product at issue.
84 Instead,
those decisions, according to the court, merely applied well-settled
rules regarding the need for expert testimony. 8 Distinguishing its prior
cases from the Sixth District cases, the First District stated that
Lunghi and Bates did not involve a bizarre accident, as in Akers, nor
a typical consumer product, as in West.86 The First District noted
that expert testimony was necessary in Lunghi and Bates to establish
77. Id. at 649-50, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
78. Id.
79. 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1985).
80. West, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 865-66, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58.
81. Id. at 866, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
82. Id. at 866-67, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 458. The court also ruled that the trial court properly
admitted testimony regarding the nature of consumer complaints which the defendant had
received concerning the tampons, not to prove the truth of the matters asserted in the
complaints, but to show that the complaints had been made to the defendant. Id. at 861, 220
Cal. Rptr. at 455.
83. 181 Cal. App. 3d 726, 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1986).
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how the complex machinery should perform under the circumstances
of the case. 7 Finally, the court observed that the consumer expectation
test could have applied in Lunghi and Bates if the plaintiff had
presented expert testimony on the reasonable expectations of a con-
sumer. 8
It is doubtful that the interpretations of the test by the two courts
of appeal can be reconciled, as Rosburg suggests. In Rosburg, the
First District stated, just as it did in Lunghi and Bates, that the
consumer expectation test can apply, without expert testimony, where
"the product at issue is within the scope of common experi-
ence .. ."89 Thus, the First and Sixth District Courts of Appeal
continue to disagree regarding the circumstances under which the
consumer expectation test is applicable. The First District finds that
the test can apply only when consumers are familiar with the product
at issue, whereas the Sixth District concludes that the test can apply
when the use of the product is a matter of common experience.90
C. Admissibility of Evidence Regarding Punitive Damages.
Like other courts, the Sixth District has shown that it will resist
any effort to extend the tort of breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to an action on the context of a commercial
contract. In Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda Inc.,91 a car owner sued
a car dealership for fraud and bad faith denial of a contract after
the dealership had failed to perform its obligations under an alleged
oral consignment for sale of the owner's car. The trial court allowed
the plaintiff to introduce evidence of the amount of attorneys' fees
which he had incurred in the litigation, as well as the dealership's
bad faith litigation tactics, to support his claim for punitive damages. 92
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 733, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 303. The court cited Akers, of all cases, for that
proposition. Id.
90. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981),
the Second District Court of Appeal approved the consumer expectation test jury instruction
given by the trial court in a personal injury action. Id. at 801-02, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 377. Given
that the product at issue was a car, the instruction would have been proper whether the issue
was a consumer's familiarity with the product or with the use of the product. Therefore,
Grimshaw does not help resolve the conflict in authority.
91. 193 Cal. App. 3d 530, 238 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1987).
92. Palmer, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
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The court of appeal reversed, holding that the admission of that
evidence was prejudicial error.93
In Palmer, the Sixth District Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the proffered evidence was admissible under the su-
preme court decision in White v. Western Title Insurance Co.94 In
White, the court allowed an insured, in an action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against his insurance
company, to present evidence of his litigation expenses as one com-
ponent of damages resulting from that tort.95 Given that Palmer
involved a typical commercial contract, the Sixth District refused to
extend White to permit introduction of evidence of litigation expenses
to establish punitive, rather than compensatory, damages in an action
which lacked any special relationship between the parties.9 In this
regard, the court noted that the supreme court, in Seaman's Direct
Buying Service Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,97 refused to extend the tort
of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
a breach of contract case involving a mere commercial contract.
9 8
Finally, the Sixth District explained that an attorney's actions in
defending a bad faith lawsuit are not relevant to the issue of whether
the attorney's client acted in bad faith prior to the lawsit.99
It should be noted that the supreme court, in Seaman's, discussed
the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, but held that the defendant was potentially liable for a
different tort: bad faith denial of the existence of a contract.: ° The
Seaman's tort can apply in the context of an ordinary commercial
contract so long as the defendant denies, in bad faith and without
probable cause, that the contract exists. Indeed, Seaman's itself
involved a typical commercial contract: a dealership agreement be-
tween an oil supplier and a marina operator whereby the oil company
would supply the fuel requirements of the marina operator. 10' There-
fore, the applicability of the Seaman's tort should not be confused
93. Id. at 540, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
94. Id. at 537, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (citing white v. western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d
870, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, (1985)).
95. White, 40 Cal. 3d at 890, 710 P.2d at 320, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
96. Palmer, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 538-39, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
97. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
98. Palmer, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 538, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
99. Id. at 539, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
100. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
101. Id. at 760-61, 686 P.2d at 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
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with the scope of the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
The Sixth District decision in Palmer is well reasoned and consistent
with the current trend among California courts to limit application
of the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to actions involving special relationships between the parties. 102
D. The Court Decides Its First AIDS Case.
The Sixth District has had occasion to decide a case involving the
issue of strict liability for the transfer of acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS) from a blood transfusion. In Hyland Therapeutics
v. Superior Court,103 the court held that the manufacturer of a blood
product provides a service-and does not conduct a sale-under the
plain language of California Health and Safety Code section 1606; 114
consequently, the manufacturer could not be sued under a strict
product liability theory for the sale of a blood product contaminated
with a virus known to cause AIDS. 05 The court concluded that the
separation of powers doctrine precluded it from rewriting the unam-
biguous statutory language and that section 1606 did not deny equal
protection to users of blood products.'06
Despite the sympathetic posture of the plaintiffs (the decedent's
heirs), the court's decision was sound and was supported by solid
precedent. In two cases involving the transmission of hepatitis by
means of a blood transfusion, the courts held that section 1606
precluded the plaintiffs from pursuing a strict liability theory against
102. See, e.g., Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768-69, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr.
354, 362-63; Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 631-32, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190
(2nd Dist. 1988) (ruling that limousine lessor-lessee relationship was not a special relationship);
Martin v. U-Haul Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 412-15, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26-18 (5th Dist.
1988) (finding that equipment rental dealership with rental company was not a special
relationship); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516,
209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (4th Dist. 1985) (concluding that a banker-bank depositor relationship
was a special relationship). In its recent decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.
3d 654, 690-93, 765 P.2d 373, 394-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 232-34 (1988), the California
Supreme Court declined to embrace the special relationship test, but did decide that the
employer-employee relationship was not a special relationship (like, for example, the insurer-
insured relationship) in holding that a terminated employee could not sue his former employer
in tort for breach of the implied coveneant of good faith and fair dealing.
103. 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985).
104. CAL. HEALTH & Sar'Y CODE § 1606 (West 1979).
105. Hyland Therapeutics, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 516-17, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
106. Id. at 514-16, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 592-94.
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a blood manufacturer or supplier. 107 In Hyland, the result was not as
harsh as it may seem because the plaintiffs were not deprived of any
remedy. The Sixth District merely directed the trial court to sustain
the blood manufacturer's demurrer to the cause of action for strict
product liability, but left the plaintiffs free to pursue an action for
negligence.
In tort cases, the Sixth District has proceeded with great caution.
The court has strictly interpreted and applied statutes which cut off
rights, even if its ruling renders a severely injured plaintiff bereft of
a remedy.' °0 In doing so, the court has stated that the legislature,
rather than the judiciary, should establish the statutory exceptions
advocated by the plaintiffs.'09 In a similar vein, the court has shown
that it is not receptive to an extension of the tort of breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to situations in which
no special relationship exists between the parties. 10 Also, the court
has refused to allow the heirs of an AIDS victim to proceed with a
strict liability action against a manufacturer of a blood product,
resting its decision on the separation of powers doctrine.' An excep-
tion to the court's judicial conservatism in tort cases is that it adopted
a liberal version of the consumer expectations test, which requires
less proof to establish a strict product liability claim.1
2
IV. EMPLOYm:ENT TRENDS
The Sixth District has issued several significant decisions in the
area of employment law. Without exception, the court has ruled in
favor of employers in every case. For example, employers prevailed
in all five published wrongful termination cases decided by the court.1
3
107. Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 750-52, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417,
420-21 (1977); McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866,
870-71, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446-47 (1976).
108. See supra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
113. See Fowler v. Varian Assocs., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 241 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1987);
Gerdiund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 190 Cal. App. 3d 263, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1987);
Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 231 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1986); Mixon
v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 237 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1987);
Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 228 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1986). See
also infra notes 114-156 (discussing these five opinions).
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A. Pro-Employer Decisions in Wrongful Termination Cases
In Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 114 the court held that an
employer's good faith belief in the existence of good cause for
termination of an employee is a valid defense to an action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even if no
good cause for discharge actually existed." 5 The employee's written
employment agreement contained an at-will termination provision, but
the employer had a personnel manual which required that the employer
have "reasons" for terminating an employee. The employer had
contended that it had an honest belief that discharge of the plaintiff
was for a proper business reason because the plaintiff had punched
another employee and had stated that he could not work with the
other employee and would do the same thing again under the same
circumstances. The Sixth District ruled that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on the employer's good
faith defense." 6 In arriving at its holding, the court relied upon
Koehrer v. Superior Court,"7 an opinion authored by supreme court
Justice Kaufman, then a Fourth District Court of Appeal Justice.
In Koehrer, Justice Kaufman drew the contours which differentiate
actions for breach of an employment contract (breach of an implied
covenant to terminate only for good cause), tortious discharge (ter-
mination in violation of a public policy) and bad faith discharge
(breach of the implied covenant of good faitho and fair dealing)."'
He also stated that the Seaman's tort, like the tort of bad faith
discharge, necessarily involved a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 19 Applying Seaman's in the wrongful
termination context, Justice Kaufman concluded that termination of
an employee does not violate the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing where the employer asserts in good faith and with probable
cause that it had good cause for termination.2 0
114. 195 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 231 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1986), review granted 732 P.2d 1072, 234
Cal. Rptr. 778 (1986).
115. Ketchu, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1605, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
116. Id. at 1605-06, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87.
117. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986).
118. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1163-68, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 824-28.
119. Id. at 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
120. Id. at 1170-71, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal. 3d
654, 715-723, 765 P.2d 373, 412-18, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 250-56 (1988) (Kaufman, J. dissenting),
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The portion of the Koehrer decision upon which Ketchu relied is
troublesome. Justice Kaufman's interpretation of Seaman's is that the
supreme court must be understood to have decided that the defendant
was potentially liable for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 21 However, the supreme court expressly stated
in Seaman's that its decision was not predicated upon that claim.'2
Indeed, Seaman's involved an ordinary commercial contract and the
supreme court made clear that the breach of implied covenant action
should rarely, if ever, apply in a case involving an ordinary commercial
contract.'2 Thus, the supreme court unmistakably intended to create
the existence of a separate tort: for bad faith denial of a contract.
The analysis in Koehrer seems faulty to the extent that Justice
Kaufman fused the two causes of action discussed in Seaman's to
reach the result that an employer is not liable for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, so long as it had a
good faith belief in a good cause for termination. If there is no
distinction between the two causes of action analyzed in Seaman's,
any plaintiff can allege a claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in any action involving a typical
commercial contract, the very result condemned by the supreme court
in Seaman's and by numerous other courts,'2 including the Sixth
District in Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc.,'2 as noted above. In
its recent decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,1.6 the supreme
court, in holding that an action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract cannot
result in an award of tort damages, expressly rejected the attempt in
Koehrer to weld together the two causes of action that were analyzed
in Seaman's.127
The supreme court granted review in Ketchu, perhaps to decide
whether the inquiry in an action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in an employment agreement should
focus on the employer's subjective motives or its objective grounds
Justice Kaufman vigorously dissented, based in part on his Koehrer opinion, from the majority
opinion's holding that a terminated employee cannot bring against his or her former employer
a tort action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
121. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1170-71, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
122. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing some of these other opinions).
125. 193 Cal. App. 3d 530, 538-39, 238 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368.
126. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 363, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
127. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 688-89, 765 P.2d at 392-93, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31.
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for discharging an employee. The choice is critical, particularly for
employees. If the employer's subjective intent is always the key issue,
discharged employees will often receive unfair results. Armed with
knowledge of the law, employers could easily fabricate a paper trail
which reveals a good faith "belief" in valid grounds for discharge,
even if they have neither valid grounds nor a good faith belief in
valid grounds for discharge. For the terminated employee, it would
be much easier to present evidence that the objective grounds for
discharge were improper rather than that the employer's subjective
intentions were improper.
The supreme court has indicated in Foley that intent should not be
the dispositive issue. In Foley, the court disapproved Koehrer on the
ground that the intentions of the breaching party are irrelevant to
the scope of damages which a plaintiff may recover for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context because that action sounds in contract rather than tort. 28
Foley foreshadows a ruling in Ketchu that the subjective intentions
of an employer are likewise irrelevant to the issue of liability in an
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; liability in such an action should be predicated on the
employer's lack of valid, objective grounds for termination.
In a second wrongful termination case, Fowler v. Varian Associates
Inc.,' 29 the Sixth District affirmed a trial court's summary judgment
in favor of the employer on the ground that the employer had good
cause for constructive discharge of the plaintiff."10 The court found
that the plaintiff had breached his duty of loyalty to the employer
by assisting an enterprise in organizing to compete with the em-
ployer."' Although the employee argued that summary judgment
should not have issued because the existence of "good cause" for
discharge necessarily involved an issue of fact, the court rejected that
argument, concluding that the evidence of the employee's disloyalty
established the employer's good cause.12 The court reiterated its view
that an employer's good faith, reasonable belief in good cause for
termination, even if none actually existed, constitutes a valid defense
to a wrongful discharge action based upon breach of the implied
128. Id. at 699, 765 P.2d at 400-401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
129. 196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 241 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1987).
130. Fowler, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 41-43, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 42-43, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 33 Given the circumstances
in this case, the court correctly decided that the employer had good
cause for termination, notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention that
summary judgment is rarely granted where "good cause" is at issue.
In Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp.,'14 a terminated employee
claimed that his employer breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by deliberately assigning him to a job which,
as a result of a previous work-related injury, he could not perform
and by firing him after he failed to perform that job adequately. The
Sixth District affinmed the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's
wrongful termination claim.135 The court found that no evidence
supported the plaintiff's view that the employer made the job transfer
in bad faith. 3 6 Also, the evidence showed that the employee violated
the terms of his probation by performing work at an unacceptable
level. 137 The court further decided that an Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board's finding that the plaintiff was discharged for some-
thing less than misconduct did not collaterally estop the employer
from demonstrating that the employee was discharged exclusively for
poor performance because "misconduct" in the context of unem-
ployment compensation proceedings does not include inefficiency or
unsatisfactory job performance. 3 Finally, the court likewise rejected
the plaintiff's racial discrimination claim based upon its finding that
he was terminated, instead, for poor job performance. 3 9
In Robinson, the Sixth District ruled in favor of the employer on
the employment law claims essentially because it found substantial
evidence that the termination resulted from the plaintiff's poor job
performance. Thus, the decision is not particularly illuminating as to
the court's approach toward employment law cases. However, the
court failed to analyze clearly the plaintiff's different employment
law claims. The court pointed out that the plaintiff was relying upon
two separate causes of action, one for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and one for breach of an implied-in-
fact promise to terminate only for good cause. 14 In analyzing the
evidence, however, the court blurred that distinction. It expressly
133. Id. at 40 n.7, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.7.
134. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 228 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1986).
135. Robinson, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1123-25, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 599-601.
136. Id. at 1123-24, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
137. Id. at 1123-25, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
138. Id. at 1123-24, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
139. Id. at 1125-26, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
140. Robinson, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1120-21, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
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rejected the plaintiff's breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing claim, but stated no conclusion regarding the claim
for breach of an implied-in-fact promise to discharge only for good
cause. 41 The flaw is understandable because, as Justice Kaufman
observed in his Koehrer opinion, courts and attorneys frequently fail
to distinguish the different claims which a discharged employee can
bring against a former employer. 42
A thorny issue in employment law is the identity of the circum-
stances under which a court should imply a promise to terminate an
employee only for good cause. In Robinson, the court noted that the
employer's "Personnel Policies and Guidelines"-as well as specific
performance evaluations, warnings and instructions actually given to
the employee-could and did establish an implied-in-fact promise to
terminate only for good cause. 43 Although the Sixth District may
find an implied termination "for cause" requirement in an office
manual, it will not find such a requirement in an alleged contempo-
raneous oral agreement which contradicts an "at will" termination
provision in a written employment contract.
In Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers International, 44 the plaintiff
sued his former employer for wrongful termination of a written
employment agreement. The agreement contained an integration clause
which stated that the written agreement superseded all other agree-
ments between the parties and constituted the parties' entire agree-
ment. The contract also recited that there were no oral or collateral
agreements between the parties. Finally, it specifically provided that
either party could terminate it on thirty days written notice for any
reason. The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
decision to admit parol evidence of the parties' alleged intention that
the employer would not terminate the plaintiff, so long as he was
doing a good job; the written agreement unmistakably was terminable
at will, while the plaintiff's theory of the case made the agreement
terminable only for good cause. 145
In a clarion opinion in Gerdlund, the Sixth District, through Justice
Brauer, held that the written employment contract was integrated and
141. Id. at 1123-25, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 599-601.
142. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1168, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 827
(1986).
143. Robinson, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1123, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 599-600 (cited with approval
in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 681-82, 765 P.2d 373, 387-88, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 225-26 (1988)).
144. 190 Cal. App. 3d 263, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1987).
145. Gerdlund, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
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thus, parol evidence was inadmissible to contradict its terms regarding
termination of the agreement.:4 Although observing that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can supply a requirement of
good cause for termination where a written contract is silent or
ambiguous on the subject of grounds for termination, the court
reasoned that the implied covenant cannot operate to destroy a right
to terminate a contract at will where that right is expressly stated in
the written contract.1 47 The court reached a proper result in a well-
reasoned decision.
In Mixon v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,'8 the
court upheld the Commission's conclusion that a union had terminated
the plaintiff, a black man, for a non-discriminatory reason, even
though he had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.149
The court accepted the union's claim that the firing resulted from its
desire to reduce expenses incurred from the employee's long com-
mute. 50 Ultimately, it decided that the employee failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory animus was
the true cause for his discharge.' 5' The court found against the
employee despite considerable evidence of discrimination, an admin-
istrative law judge decision in favor of the employee, and a final
decision by a divided (3-2) Commission against the employee. 5 2 The
result could be explained by the court's strict application of the
pertinent standard of review. The employee challenged the Commis-
sion's decision on the ground that it was not supported by the findings,
rather than on the ground that the findings were not supported by
the evidence. Thus, the Sixth District stated that it would not consider,
for the first time on appeal, whether substantial evidence supported
the Commission's decision. 53 The court's holding was that the Com-
mission's findings supported its conclusion that the employee's ter-
mination did not result from racial discrimination. 54 In reaching that
conclusion, however, the court did not simply analyze the Commis-
sion's findings and conclusions. It did sift through the evidence. The
evidence showed that the defendant had not terminated eight white
146. Id. at 270-72, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83.
147. Id. at 277, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
148. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 237 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1987).
149. Mixon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1320-23, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 892-94.
150. Id. at 1320, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
151. Id. at 1319-22, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 892-94.
152. Id. at 1311-16, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 886-89.
153. Id. at 1310-11, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
154. Id. at 1323, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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employees who had long commutes.' 55 The union's countervailing
evidence - that the eight white workers did not work in the Stockton
office and were employed before a new controller began cracking
dawn on long commutes whereas, the plaintiff did work in the
Stockton office (where dues could not cover operating expenses) and
started his job after the crackdown on long commutes - was hardly
credible. 5 6 If part of the Stockton office's expenses had to be paid
from sources other than dues from Stockton members, that source
could pay the small additional expense resulting from the plaintiff's
long commute. Also, if the crack down on long commutes was so
essential to reduce operating expenses, the policy should have applied
to all employees. If the evidence in this case was material, it strongly
supported the conclusion that the union failed to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case of racial discrimination.
In each of its published wrongful termination cases, the Sixth
District ruled in favor of the employer. A recurring theme was that
an employer has broad discretion to terminate an employee for poor
job performance, even in the face of evidence of discrimination against
the employee. It seems too early, however, to conclude that the court
is deciding wrongful termination cases based upon a politically con-
servative philosophy. The court's holding in Ketchu-that an employ-
er's good faith belief in good cause for discharge is a valid defense
to a wrongful termination action-was questionable. The Mixon result
was also questionable although perhaps correct in light of the standard
of review recited by the court. Otherwise, the court based its decisions
on the sufficiency of the evidence and sound legal analysis. The
court's future decisions in wrongful termination cases deserve special
attention.
B. Pro-Employer Decisions in Public Employee Dismissal Cases.
In employment law cases, the government, as employer, enjoyed
the same favorable results from the Sixth District as private employers.
In Sienkiewicz v. County of Santa Cruz,157 a county detention officer,
after sustaining facial injuries in a motorcycle accident, informed his
commanding officer that he was psychologically unfit to perform his
155. Id. at 1321, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
156. Id.
157. 195 Cal. App. 3d 134, 240 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1987).
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regular duties involving inmate contact without posing a threat of
danger to himself and other workers. He was assigned to a light duty
position for the first nine months after he returned to work. After
the nine months passed, he requested that the sheriff allow him to
keep the light duty position for three additional months, at which
time his status would be reevaluated. In response, the sheriff forced
him to work his regular job and, a few days later, effectively
suspended him without any prior notice or hearing. 158 After he ap-
pealed that decision to the county Civil Service Commission, the
Commission held a hearing on the suspension and scheduled a second
hearing.5 9 Before the second hearing, he was fired. 60 At the second
hearing, evidence was introduced to show that the sheriff had a policy
to accommodate injured officers with appropriate light duty assign-
ments involving limited inmate contact.' 61
In Sienkiewicz, the Sixth District held that the discharge was proper,
concluding that the plaintiff, although a permanent employee who
had a vested right to continued employment, had no right to retain
a specific job assignment, such as a light duty job.162 The court
reasoned that a public employer may enforce mental or physical
standards reasonably related to the employee's job duties and to the
health and safety of the employee and other workers. 6 1 Consequently,
the court concluded that the sheriff's termination of the plaintiff was
proper because the employee had stated that he was unfit to perform
his duties without posing a threat of danger to other workers and
himself.?64 The discharge was not an excessively severe penalty, ac-
cording to the court, because it was reasonably related to the danger
posed to the sheriff's office. 65 Finally, the court determined that the
county did not deny the employee due process, even though he was
afforded an administrative appeal subsequent to his suspension.'6 Due
process only requires, in the case of a short-term suspension, that a
public employer afford the disciplined employee only an opportunity
to respond to the charges either while the suspension is in effect or
within a reasonable time afterwards. 67
158. Sienkiewicz, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 137-40, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 452-54.
162. Id. at 141-42, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
163. Id. at 142, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
164. Id. at 141-42, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
165. Id. at 143, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
166. Id. at 141, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
167. Id.
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The Sixth District's decision in Sienkiewicz was both harsh and
unjustifiable. The commission did not provide the employee with a
pre-termination hearing, in violation of the due process standards set
forth in the supreme court's decision in the landmark case of Skelly
v. State Personnel Board.16 The commission's first hearing occurred
before the employee's discharge, but concerned only his suspension.
The second hearing concerned both the suspension and the discharge,
but both forms of discipline were accomplished facts at the time of
the second hearing. Moreover, the record suggested that the county
may have discharged the employee for the impermissible reason that
the employee had challenged his suspension before the Civil Service
Commission. 16 9 Also, the discipline seemed excessive in view of the
fact that the employee requested only a few more months, and not
permanent placement, at the light duty position and the sheriff had
a policy to accommodate injured officers with light duty assignments.
In sum, it appears that the employee was denied due process, was
terminated for an unlawful retaliatory reason and received excessive
discipline under the circumstances.
In County of Santa Clara v. Willis, 70 the Sixth District found that
a disciplined employee had failed to perform his duties to care for
paralyzed patients in a responsible manner, failed to maintain satis-
factory and harmonious working relationships with patients and em-
ployees and engaged in gross misconduct (including making sexual
advances toward patients and other workers). 17' On these facts, the
court ruled that a county personnel board had abused its discretion
in reinstating the employee. 172 In deciding whether an agency has
abused its discretion in the context of public employee discipline, the
court explained, the primary consideration is whether the employee's
conduct has caused or is likely to cause harm to the public service. 73
Under the circumstances of this case, the Sixth District properly
concluded that the employee's conduct resulted in public harm.
In its two public employee cases, the Sixth District showed no more
sympathy for terminated public employees than it has shown for
168. 15 Cal. 3d 194, 215, 539 P.2d 774, 788-89, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14, 28-29 (1975).
169. See Sienkiewicz, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 139-40, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54 (plaintiff was
dismissed after he appealed the sheriff's suspension decision and before the Civil Service
Commission completed hearings on his appeal, even though he received an adequate evaluation
of his job performance a week after he had resumed his detention officer duties).
170. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1240, 225 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1986).
171. Willis, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1251-52, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1251, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
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discharged private employees. The court seemed to take a broad view
of an employer's right to terminate an employee based upon the
employee's job performance. The evidence seemed to justify the result
in Willis. In Sienkiewicz, however, the result seemed unfair because
countervailing circumstances should have outweighed the job perform-
ance factor, especially where the employee had not been guilty of
poor performance on the job.
C. Pro-Employer Ruling in Unlawful Competition Case
In its only reported unlawful competition case, the Sixth District
addressed the novel question of whether Business and Professions
Code section 16600174 voids a non-interference agreement between an
employer and a terminated employee that precludes the latter from
raiding employees of their former employer. In Loral Corp. v. Moyes,175
the court answered the question in the negative, ruling that the trial
court erred in granting a nonsuit as to the employer's cause of action
for breach of the termination agreement, following its opening state-
ment at trial. 176 The court reasoned that a restraint against raiding
the employees of the former employer would have no greater impact
on the former employee's profession or business than a clearly lawful
restraint on disclosure of confidential information or on solicitation
of customers. 177 Significantly, the court narrowly 'construed the con-
tractual restraint to prohibit the terminated employee only from
making the first contact; the former officer could receive applications
from and hire employees of his former employer if they contacted
him first.178 The opinion of Justice Agliano was well-reasoned and
achieved a proper resolution of this question of first impression.
D. Pro-Employer Rulings in Labor Law Cases
The Sixth District ruled in favor of employers in two cases con-
cerning the fights and duties of union employees. In the first of these
cases, Watsonville Canning & Frozen Food Co. v. Superior Court,1
79
174. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West, 1987). Section 16600 voids any contract
which restrains any person from engaging in a lawful business or profession. Id.
175. 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1985).
176. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
177. Id. at 279, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
178. Id. at 279-80, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
179. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 224 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1986).
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the Sixth District held that an overbroad injunction order issued in a
labor dispute was not void because the activities of the union local
members enjoined by the order were not privileged nor constitutionally
protected. 180 The court distinguished the supreme court decision in In
re Berry8' on the ground that the overbroad order in Berry, unlike
the injunction in Watsonville Canning, prohibited labor activities in
violation of the constitutional right to freedom of speech.'82
The Watsonville Canning decision is sound only if the distinction
between that case and Berry is also sound. In Berry, the supreme
court decided that an injunction against a union was completely
invalid based upon an application of the rule that an injunction in a
labor dispute is entirely void if a court cannot reasonably eliminate
its invalid restrictions on free speech from its lawful provisions.'83 In
Watsonville Canning, the order was partially invalid because it en-
joined union local members from making threats or engaging in acts
of physical violence against interested parties, as well as against "any
other person."' 14 Thus, the order extended the controversy beyond
the parties to the dispute. However, the portion of the order which
enjoined threats or acts of violence against any other person could
be disregarded as surplusage. 8 5 Accordingly, the Sixth District cor-
rectly determined that the valid portion of the order was enforceable.
In another labor case, the Sixth District held that the Federal
Railway Labor Act 186 preempted state tort law as to any claim by an
airline employee against her employer that was subject to the appli-
cable collective bargaining agreement between the airline and the
employee's union.'17 The court rejected the employee's creative attempt
to avoid preemption with the argument that state tort law should
apply because she had no adequate remedy for emotional and physical
distress under the applicable collective bargaining agreement. 8  In-
stead, the Sixth District preferred a strict construction and application
of the pertinent statute. The decision seems correct because the
plaintiff's claims necessarily arose under her union's collective bar-
180. Id. at 1246-47, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06.
181. 68 Cal. 2d 137, 154-56, 436 P.2d 273, 285-86, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 285-86 (1968).
182. Watsonville Canning, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1247-48, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07.
183. Berry, 68 Cal. 2d at 156-57, 436 P.2d at 286, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
184. Watsonville Canning, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1246, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
185. Id. at 1248, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07.
186. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-189 (1982).
187. Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 889, 220 Cal. Rptr. 684, 691
(1985).
188. Miller, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 887, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
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gaining agreement with her employer. That agreement required that
she pursue a grievance and arbitration process as the exclusive remedy
for any dispute with her employer.
189
E. Pro-Employer Rulings in Two Workers' Compensation Cases
In two cases, the Sixth District refused to allow workers to pursue,
in lieu of workers' compensation benefits, negligence actions against
employers to recover damages for job-related injuries. In Santa Cruz
Poultry, Inc. v. Superior Court,190 a temporary employee was injured
on the job to which he was assigned by his temporary employment
agency. If the company for whom the employee actually performed
the work were deemed to be his employer, his exclusive remedy for
the job-related injury would be workers' compensation under Cali-
fornia Labor Code section 3601.191 The court of appeal determined
that the primary consideration, in ascertaining whether a special
employment relationship exists in a case where an injured employee
may have two employers, is whether the special employer exercised
control over the details of the employee's work.92 Ultimately, the
court found that the injured employee was controlled and directed by
the employer for whom he performed the work and therefore could
not bring an action for negligence against that employer under section
3601.193
In reaching its decision, the Sixth District distinguished the supreme
court case of Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co.194 In Kowalski, the plaintiff,
an employee of a general contractor, sued Shell to recover for job-
related injuries which he sustained on Shell's job site. The jury
returned a special verdict finding that Kowalski was not Shell's special
employee. 95 The trial court granted Shell's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that Kowalski was a special
employee of Shell'9 and thus, he was relegated to his workers'
compensation remedy.97 The supreme court reversed, holding that
189. Id. at 886-89, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 689-91.
190. 194 Cal. App. 3d 575, 239 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1987).
191. Santa Cruz Poultry, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 578, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 580. See CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3601 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
192. Santa Cruz Poultry, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 579-80, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81.
193. Id. at 583, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
194. 23 Cal. 3d 168, 588 P.2d 811, 151 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1979).
195. Id. at 174, 588 P.2d at 814, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 172, 588 P.2d at 813, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
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the plaintiff never consented to an employment relationship with
Shell. 9 The supreme court also specifically noted that the critical
inquiry in deciding whether a special employment relationship exists
is whether the special employer had the right to direct and control
the work performed by the putative employee. 199
In Santa Cruz Poultry, there was a question of fact as to whether
the injured employee consented to an employment relationship with
the special employer, and for that reason, the trial court denied the
employer's summary judgment motion.200 Focusing on the control-
over-the-employee test, the Sixth District concluded that the employee
consent rule in Kowalski was mere dictum. 201 The analysis of Kowalski
could have gone either way. One could read Kowalski to require
proof of both employer control and employee consent in order to
establish a special employment relationship. The Sixth District did
not do so. Instead, the court determined that employer control was
the critical test and that employee consent was incidental; a special
employment relationship exists if the employer proves its control over
the employee, even if there was no evidence of employee consent.202
Thus, the court issued a writ directing the trial court to enter summary
judgment in favor of the special employer.? The court's analysis of
Kowalski is analytically sound, but not compelling. Other courts may
discern more significance in the result in Kowalski and decide that
Kowalski should be construed to require employee consent.
In an employee's action under California Labor Code section
4558, 204 the court properly affirmed a trial court's summary judgment
in favor of the employer. 205 In Swanson v. Matthews Products, Inc.,2o6
the court determined that the employee had failed to produce sufficient
evidence to establish any of the following requisite elements: (1) The
equipment manufacturer attached or required the attachment of safety
guards to the power press; (2) the manufacturer apprised the employer
of those specifications; and (3) the employer authorized the non-
198. Kowalski, 23 Cal. 3d at 178-79, 588 P.2d at 817-18, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
199. Id. at 175, 588 P.2d at 815, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
200. Santa Cruz Poultry, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 579, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
201. Id. at 581, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
202. Id. at 579-84, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 581-84.
203. Id. at 584, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
204. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4558 (West Supp. 1989). Section 4558 creates an exception to theworkers' compensation laws by allowing an action against an employer by an employee injuredas a result of the absence of a power press safety guard under certain circumstances. Id.205. Swanson v. Matthews Products, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 3d 901, 221 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1985).
206. 175 Cal. App. 3d 901, 221 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1985).
1096
1989 / Sixth District Court of Appeal
installation or removal of the safety guards on the power press.
2°7
The Sixth District ruled in favor of the employer in every one of
the above employment law cases. In most cases, the court's decision
seems analytically sound. In some cases, however, the result seems
questionable and suggests that the court favors employers in labor
disputes. For example, the court's adoption of a "good faith belief"
defense in wrongful termination cases seems much easier for employers
to prove than "good cause" for discharge. Also, the court seems to
uphold any discharge ostensibly based on job performance, dismissing
the employee's countervailing evidence. Moreover, when the analysis
and decision could have gone either way, the court decided to make
it easier for an employer to prove a "special relationship" with a
temporary employee and thereby bar, under the Workers' Compen-
sation laws, the employee's action to recover for job-related injuries.
The court's future employment law cases should hold great interest.
Will this pro-employer trend in employment law cases continue or
are the results in employment law cases during the court's first three
years a mere coincidence?
V. REAL PROPERTY TENr)s
The Sixth District has issued several significant opinions regarding
rights to real property. These opinions offer clear trends and dem-
onstrate that the court does not reach its decisions based upon any
particular ideology.
A. Enforcement of the Protections Afforded to Debtors by the
Anti-Deficiency Laws
California courts have repeatedly rejected efforts by secured cred-
itors to avoid the effect of the anti-deficiency statutes208 through
evasive schemes. 20 In doing so, the courts follow the rationale in the
207. Swanson, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 906-08, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 86-88.
208. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE §§ 580a, 580b, 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
209. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 605, 542 P.2d 981, 991-92, 125
Cal. Rptr. 557, 567-68 (1975) (holding that California Code of Civil Procedure section 580d
barred a creditor from recovering a judgment for waste following a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale unless the debtor caused the waste in bad faith); Freediand v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d 462,
466-67, 289 P.2d 463, 465 (1955) (ruling that section 580d precluded a creditor from obtaining
a judgment on one note for $7,000 after foreclosing on real property which secured a second
note for $7,000 from the same debtor where the debtor indisputably owed only one obligation
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supreme court's celebrated decision in Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino210
that a creditor who holds real property security is never entitled to a
double recovery; the creditor cannot obtain both irredeemable title to
the real property security following a foreclosure sale and a deficiency
judgment. 211 In its first three years, the Sixth District has adhered to
this tradition.
In Ballengee v. Sadier,212 the holders of a second deed of trust bid
in the real property security at their foreclosure sale, but never
acquired title under a trustee's deed. The holder of the first deed of
trust subsequently acquired title at its foreclosure sale. The former
holders of the second trust deed sued to collect on their promissory
note. The Sixth District held that their action was barred by California
Code of Civil Procedure section 580d,2 13 concluding that their fore-
closure sale constituted a completed sale of the real property security,
even though no trustee's deed had been executed to transfer title to
them. 214 Section 580d precluded a deficiency judgment because the
property had been sold under power of sale in a deed of trust. 21 The
plaintiffs argued that they were still junior lienholders at the time of
the senior lienor's sale and became sold-out junior llenors at that
sale, thereby allowing them to collect on the note. The court, however,
expressly rejected that argument. 21 6 Accordingly, in its first encounter
with the anti-deficiency laws, the Sixth District correctly refused to
permit a creditor to evade those laws through an artful device.
In Pacific Valley Bank v. Schwenke,2 7 the court addressed the
novel question of whether the one-action rule, set forth in California
Code of Civil Procedure section 726,28 protects a co-obligor who is
not a party to the deed of trust which secures the debt. 21 9 In that
case, the beneficiary-bank reconveyed a co-debtor's deed of trust, on
which the defendant-debtor was not a trustor, without the knowledge
of $7,000 to the creditor); Union Bank v. Wendland, 54 Cal. App. 3d 393, 406-07, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 549, 558-59 (1976) (concluding that a bank, after foreclosing on a first deed of trust
and thereby extinguishing the second deed of trust which it also held, could not sue on the
note for which the second trust deed had served as security).
210. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
211. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 43-44, 378 P.2d at 101-02, Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
212. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1, 224 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1986).
213. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (,Vest 1976 & Supp. 1989).
214. Ballengee, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 4-5, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
215. Id. at 5, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
216. Id. at 4, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
217. 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1987).
218. CAL. Cxv. PRoc. CODE § 726 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
219. Pacific Valley Bank, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
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or consent of the defendant-debtor. The bank sued to recover on the
underlying promissory note. The Sixth District, in a majority opinion
written by Justice Brauer, ruled that the bank's action was barred by
the one-action rule in Code of Civil Procedure section 726.m Justice
Brauer explained that section 726 applied to all notes secured by
deeds of trust, regardless of whether the obligor under the note and
the trustor under the deed of trust are the same person. 22 A debtor
can waive the protections of section 726 by allowing a beneficiary to
cancel a deed of trust without cancelling the underlying note.' In
this case, however, the bank reconveyed the co-debtor's deed of trust
without notifying or receiving the consent of the defendant-debtor
and thereby unilaterally relinquished its security in violation of the
section 726 protectionsY3
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Agliano stated that section 726 was
inapplicable because the trial court had found that the defendant had
agreed with the co-obligor, whose trust deed was reconveyed, to pay
the balance due on the note and therefore, the defendant waived the
right to claim that the co-obligor's property was primarily responsible
for the debt. 4 Justice Agliano believed that the defendant waived
the protections of section 726, even though the defendant did not
advise the bank that he had consented to the reconveyance of the co-
obligor's deed of trustY5 Justice Brauer disagreed, pointing out that
the defendant had stated that he would assume responsibility for the
debt in negotiations for the dissolution of his partnership with the
trustor under the deed of trust.22 Thus, the defendant's statement
constituted a mere "balance sheet entry," rather than a modification
of the loan agreement between him and the bank.27 Also, the defen-
dant never communicated to the bank any intention to release the
security. Thus, Justice Brauer found that there was insufficient evi-
dence to establish a waiver of section 726.n8
In both cases, the court applied the anti-deficiency laws in favor
of the debtor. In Balingee, the court blocked a blatant scheme to
220. Id. at 140-41, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
221. Id. at 142, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
222. Id. at 141-42, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
223. Id.
224. Pacific Valley Bank, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 147-48, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07 (Agliano,
J. dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 145, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
227. Id. at 145, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.
228. Id. at 145, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
1099
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
evade those statutes. In Pacific Valley Bank the court ruled for the
debtor, even though the creditor did not seem to engage in deceptive
conduct. Indeed, it appeared that the defendant had even agreed to
pay the note at issue before he sought refuge in the anti-deficiency
laws. Accordingly, it appears that the Sixth District will interpret and
apply the anti-deficiency laws so as to afford debtors maximum
protection.
B. Rights and Duties of Junior Lienor
The Sixth District published two opinions concerning the rights and
duties of a junior lienholder who seeks to protect his or her interests
at a senior lienholder's foreclosure sale. In Pacific Trust Co. TTEE
v. Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association,221 the holder of a
junior deed of trust sought to take over property subject to pending
foreclosure proceedings by paying off a note secured by a senior trust
deed . 0 The court concluded that the junior lienor must pay all sums
which the borrower was obligated to pay to the senior lender, including
any prepayment penalty.21 The rationale for this result was that the
junior lienor had constructive notice of the terms of the senior deed
of trust, including the terms regarding defaults, and had an accom-
panying duty to inquire about the terms of the underlying promissory
note. Thus, it could redeem the property only upon the same con-
tractual terms as the borrower, even though the junior lenor was not
a party to the senior note and trust deed .2 2 The junior lienor also
argued that the prepayment penalty provision in the senior note was
invalid as an unreasonable liquidated damages clause under California
Civil Code section 1671.211 The court rejected that argument because
such a provision is authorized by Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Regulations, which preempt the state statute in the event that the two
are in conflict. 4
At first glance, this decision appears to break new ground. The
courts usually hold that a prepayment penalty clause is operative only
when the borrower prepays the obligation; it is not triggered by the
229. 184 Cal. App. 3d 817, 229 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1986).
230. Pacific Trust, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 270-01.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 825-26, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.
233. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (West 1982).
234. Pacific Trust, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 822-23, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
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lender's election to accelerate and require full payment upon default.235
Notwithstanding this line of cases, the Sixth District decided that the
senior lender could enforce the prepayment penalty clause upon
acceleration of the debt.23 The prepayment penalty clause in Pacific
Trust, however, specifically required payment of the penalty:
"... whether said prepayment is voluntary or involuntary, including
any prepayment effected by the holder's exercise of the Acceleration
Clause. ' ' 2 7 Thus, the Pacific Trust decision is best understood as a
case which turns on its peculiar facts, rather than as a departure from
existing law. A lender which desires to achieve the result in Pacific
Trust should simply utilize the language in the prepayment clause
involved in that case. A junior lienor who seeks to avoid that result
would need to obtain from the senior lender, before the junior lender
approved its loan to the borrower, a special waiver of the prepayment
penalty clause in the event that the junior lienor redeems the property.
In Pacific Loan Management Corp. v. Superior Court,28 the Sixth
District faced the novel issue of whether the trustor or a junior lienor
is entitled to the surplus proceeds resulting from a senior lienor's
foreclosure sale where the junior lienor bid in the property at that
sale. The court concluded that, absent collusion or fraud, the junior
lienor was entitled to have its debt satisfied, in whole or in part, out
of surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the security, even if it
purchased the property at that sale. a9 In other words, the junior
lienor does not forfeit its equitable claim to receive the surplus
proceeds simply because it was the purchaser at the senior lenor's
foreclosure sale. The court explained that the result was just because
the junior lenor could not use the amount of its lien as a credit bid
at the senior lienor's foreclosure sale, and it would have to pay the
amount of its bid in cash, like any other bidder.m Consequently, the
junior lienholder has no unfair advantage at that sale.
In Pacific Loan, the trustor argued that the case was governed by
the decision in Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham,41 which
235. Id, at 824, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74 (citing Tan v. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
140 Cal. App. 3d 800, 810-811, 189 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782-83 (1983); Slevin Container Corp. v.
Provident Fed. Say., 98 IMl. App. 3d 646, 424 N.E.2d 939, 940-41 (1981); McCarthy v.
Louisiana Timeshare Venture, 426 So. 2d 1342, 1346 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); 1346 American
Fed. Sav. v. Mid-America Service, 329 N.W.2d 124, 125-126 (S.D. 1983).
236. Pacific Trust, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
237. Id.
238. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1987).
239. Pacific Loan, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1492-95, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 551-53.
240. Id. at 1493, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
241. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (4th Dist. 1985).
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held that a junior lienor who purchases the property at a senior
lienor's foreclosure sale is subject to the fair value limitations of
California Code of Civil Procedure section 580a 2 because the junior
lienor cannot obtain a double recovery as a result of an "underbid"
(a bid below market value).243 The Sixth District distinguished Walter
E. Heller on the ground that the junior lienor in Pacific Loan overbid
the property, whereas the Walter E. Heller junior lienholder under-
bid.2 This difference was significant because if the Pacific Loan
junior lienor received the surplus proceeds from the overbid, the
amount of its debt would be reduced, as would the amount of any
deficiency judgment in favor of the junior lienor.245 For these practical
reasons, the anti-deficiency laws could not aid the debtor under the
circumstances.
In his majority opinion in Pacific Loan, Justice Brauer made an
important contribution to a complicated area of law. He correctly
decided the novel question of a junior lienor's entitlement to the
surplus proceeds from a senior lienor's foreclosure sale. The trustor
would receive a windfall if he or she could keep the surplus proceeds
and just ignore the junior debt. By contrast, the surplus proceeds
constitute partial payment on the junior debt for the junior lienor
who must pay off the senior debt in cash in order to purchase the
property at the foreclosure sale. Justice Brauer's analysis was sound,
even though the result was that the anti-deficiency laws did not favor
the debtor.
C. Pro-Landlord Decisions in Landlord/Tenant Cases
The Sixth District has resolved all three published cases regarding
the rights and duties of landlords and tenants in favor of landlords.
One decision laid down a significant ruling on the allocation of the
burden of proof in an unlawful detainer action.
In Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes,2- the Sixth District
decided the question of whether the landlord or the tenant has the
burden of proof on the issue of the landlord's retaliatory motive in
an eviction action. The court held:
242. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
243. Walter E. Heller, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
244. Pacific Loan, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1494-95, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
245. Id.
246. 175 Cal. App. 3d 724, 220 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1985).
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In an unlawful detainer action, where the defense of retaliatory
eviction is asserted pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.5, the tenant
has the overall burden of proving his landlord's retaliatory motive
by a preponderance of the evidence. If the landlord takes action for
a valid reason not listed in the unlawful detainer statutes, he must
give notice to the tenant of the ground upon which he proceeds;
and if the tenant controverts that ground, the landlord has the
burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.2 7
Although the landlord has the burden, under California Civil Code
section 1942.5(e),m to establish that a non-retaliatory ground was the
true reason for the eviction, the tenant ultimately has the burden,
under Civil Code section 1942.5(a),249 of proving that the eviction was
based upon a prohibited, retaliatory reason.
In Western Land, the court expressly rejected two arguments of
the tenant: (1) that subdivisions (a) and (e) of Civil Code section
1942.5 should be construed together to place on the landlord the
burden of persuasion on the issue of the landlord's non-retaliatory
motive; and (2) that upon the tenant's presentation of evidence that
the landlord had taken an adverse action against the tenant within
180 days after the tenant had exercised protected rights, section 1942.5
establishes a rebuttable presumption of retaliation, and shifts to the
landlord the burden of proof on the issue of retaliatory motive. 2 0
First, the court reasoned that a tenant, as the proponent of the
alleged fact that the landlord had a retaliatory motive, must have the
burden to prove that fact under Evidence Code sections 500 and
520.51 Second, in Fisher v. City of Berkeley , 2 the California Supreme
Court, without mentioning Civil Code section 1942.5, decided that a
city ordinance which created a presumption of retaliation and which
thrust upon the landlord the burden to prove a non-retaliatory motive,
conflicted with Evidence Code section 500.213 Third, in 1979, the
legislature considered and rejected the adoption of a rebuttable pre-
247. Western Land Office, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 742, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 797. See CAL. Cirv.
CODE § 1942.5 (West 1985).
248. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.5(e) (West 1985).
249. Id. § 1942(a).
250. Western Land, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 740, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96.
251. Id. at 740, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 796. California Evidence Code section 500 provides that
the proponent of a fact has the burden to prove that fact. Evidence Code section 520 provides
that a party who claims that another party is guilty of wrongdoing has the burden to prove
that claim. See CAL. EvD. CODE §§ 500, 520 (West 1966 & Supp. 1989).
252. 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
253. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 698, 693 P.2d at 300-04, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 721-25. See Western
Land, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 740-41, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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sumption of a landlord's retaliatory motive in Civil Code section
1942.5.254 Finally, the court determined that the tenant always had
the burden to prove the retaliatory eviction defense under the common
law and that the California legislature never intended to modify that
rule. 55 Notwithstanding the ambiguity in the statute and the tenant's
arguments, the court's reasoning was convincing. If a tenant asserts
the defense of retaliatory eviction, he or she should have the burden
of persuasion as to that defense, unless the legislature specifies oth-
erwise.
The court again ruled in favor of a landlord in a rent control case.
In Whispering Pines Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. City of Scotts
Valley, 25 6 a city rent-review commission allowed the plaintiff to raise
rents by two percent. The Sixth District ruled that the commission's
findings were not supported by the evidence because the only evidence
before the commission on a fair rate of return for a mobile home
park was the testimony of the landowner's expert, who stated that
the minimum fair rate of return was nine percent.5 7 The commission,
according to the court, unjustifiably disregarded the expert's testi-
mony.28 The court also determined that the commission, if it intended
to rely on its expertise and knowledge regarding local real estate
matters, should have made a record of its expertise in order to allow
a reviewing court to determine whether the commission's decision had
adequate support. 9 On a procedural issue, the court found that the
commission failed to provide the landowner with notice and an
opportunity to present evidence on economic factors which the com-
mission had considered.m°
In Whispering Pines, the court did not address the constitutionality
of any provision in a rent control ordinance. Instead, the court merely
decided, on evidentiary and procedural grounds, that a rent-review
commission failed to act properly in applying a rent-control ordinance.
Thus, despite the ruling in favor of the landlord, there is no basis to
conclude that the court has any particular predisposition toward rent
control ordinances.
254. Western Land, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
255. Id. at 742, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
256. 180 Cal. App. 3d 152, 225 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1986).
257. Whispering Pines, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 158-61, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 367-69.
258. Id. at 158-60, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
259. Id. at 160-61, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
260. Id. at 160, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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In Tri-County Apartment Association v. City of Mountain View,2 1
the court held that California Civil Code section 8272 preempted a
city ordinance which provided that a landlord could not raise the rent
for residential property leased on a month-to-month basis without
giving at least sixty days notice to the tenant. 26 3 This decision was
unjustifiable. Observing that section 827 specifies the thirty-day notice
requirement and prohibits the parties from agreeing to a shorter notice
period, the court then stated its essential conclusion as follows: "With
unambiguous language, the Legislature has asserted its control over
landlord-tenant notification procedures." However, section 827
merely prescribes a minimum notice period and does not, by its terms,
reflect any intention by the legislature to preempt consistent rules or
regulations. Significantly, the city ordinance at issue merely lengthened
the notification requirement by an additional thirty days. Thus, the
ordinance was entirely consistent with section 827. Also, the ordinance
was rationally related to a legitimate objective because the city showed
that it had adopted the ordinance in order to remedy a specific local
problem: the significant community disruption caused by a rent
increase notice which made it difficult or impossible for tenants to
adjust to the increase after only thirty days. 265 Moreover, the court
misplaced its reliance upon numerous statutes which regulate the
timing of assertion of rights or satisfaction of obligations by landlords
or tenants.2 As the court previously pointed out, application of the
preemption doctrine depends upon how broadly or narrowly the field
at issue is defmed. 26 7 In Tri-County Apartment Association, the court
had already found that "the Ordinance deals with notification, ' 2e
and thus the court should not have relied upon statutes which did
not deal with notification. The preemption doctrine was inapplicable
in this case and the ordinance seemed valid.
Although the court ruled in favor of landlords in all three decisions,
it is too early to say that the Sixth District has a singular approach
to landlord-tenant cases. The issues had little in common in these
261. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1283, 242 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1987).
262. CAL. CIrV. CODE § 827 (West 1982). Section 827 provides that a landlord must give
at least 30 days written notice to a tenant before raising the rent on residential property leased
on a month-to-month basis. Id.
263. Tri-County Apartment, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1296-98, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
264. Id. at 1297, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
265. Id. at 1289, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
266. Id. at 1297-98, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
267. Id. at 1294-95, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
268. Id. at 1293, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
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three cases. Western Land decided a critical burden of proof issue in
favor of landlords, but the result seems correct. Whispering Pines
turned on an evidentiary issue. Tri-County Apartment primarily in-
volved a preemption issue. A review of the court's future landlord-
tenant cases is necessary before a trend can be discerned.
VI. PRO-CONSERVATION TREND iN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES
The Sixth District has consistently issued rulings which command
developers and public agencies to comply strictly with environmental
laws and regulations. In cases involving the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA),2 9 the court has heeded the supreme court's call
to construe CEQA so as to afford maximum protection to the
environment. 270 Outside of CEQA, the court published one decision
which favored coastal protection over a claim of impairment of
contractual rights. 271
In City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors2 2 and Cham-
berlin v. City of Palo Alto, 273 the Sixth District announced its position
on a critical CEQA issue which has divided the courts of appeal. The
issue typically arises in a case where a party challenges a public
agency's decision to adopt a negative declaration-which the agency
may do if it finds that the proposed project will have no significant
environmental effects-in lieu of the preparation of an environmental
impact report (EIR).274 Some courts, following the Fourth District's
opinion in Pacific Water Conditioning Association, Inc. v. City Coun-
cil,275 hold that the standard of review in that situation is whether
substantial evidence in light of the whole record supports the agency's
decision. 276 Other courts adopt the standard of review first articulated
by the First District in Friends of "B" Street v. City of Hayward,
277
269. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
270. See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d 1049,
1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1972).
271. Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, 179 Cal. App. 3d 814, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1986),
cert. den., 479 U.S. 803 (1986).
272. 183 Cal. App. 3d 229, 227 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1986).
273. 186 Cal. App. 3d 181, 230 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1986).
274. See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21080(c) (West 1986).
275. 73 Cal. App. 3d 546, 140 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1977).
276. Pacific Water Conditioning, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 558, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (4th Dist.
1977). Accord, Newberry Springs Water Ass'n v. County of San Bernardino, 150 Cal. App.
3d 740, 748, 198 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (4th Dist. 1984); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara, 115
Cal. App. 3d 827, 843-45, 171 Cal. Rptr. 753, 762-64 (1st Dist. 1981).
277. 106 Cal. App. 3d 988, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1980).
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which requires a court to set aside an agency's decision to dispense
with the preparation of an EIR if the court perceives substantial
evidence that the proposed project may have a significant environ-
mental impact.278 Still other courts have noted the existence of the
conflict in authority, but have found it unnecessary to choose sides
in the cases before them.279 The difference between the two standards
is quite simple. An agency's decision to proceed by negative decla-
ration is overturned under the Pacific Water Conditioning standard
only if the court finds that there is not substantial evidence supporting
the finding that the project will not have significant environmental
effects. The agency decision is reversed under the Friends of "B"
Street standard if the court finds that there is substantial evidence
that the project may have significant environmental effects.
In Chamberlin and Carmel-by-the-Sea, the Sixth District, without
discussion of the split in authority, adopted the Friends of "B" Street
standard. 20 In these two opinions authored by Justice Brauer, the
Sixth District made the correct choice. In a doubtful case, an EIR
will more likely be required if a court must look for substantial
evidence of significant environmental effects, rather than search for
substantial evidence that the proposed project will generate no signif-
icant environmental effects. The purposes of CEQA281 are more fully
satisfied if an EIR, rather than a negative declaration, is prepared in
a doubtful case. Therefore, the Sixth District adopted the standard
which maximizes protection of the environment.
In Carmel-by-the-Sea, the Sixth District held that a public agency
failed to comply with CEQA where it adopted a negative declaration
278. Friends of "B" Street, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (1st Dist.
1980). Accord, Sundstrom v. County of Mendocino, 202 Cal. App. 3d 296, 309-10, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 360-61 (1st Dist. 1988); Heninger v. Board of Supervisors, 186 Cal. App. 3d 601,
607-08, 231 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14-15 (1st Dist. 1986); Pistoresi v. City of Madera, 138 Cal. App.
3d 284, 288, 188 Cal. Rptr. 136, 139 (5th Dist. 1982); Brentwood Ass'n for No Drilling, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 134 Cal. App. 3d 491, 503-04, 184 Cal. Rptr. 664, 671-72 (2nd Dist.
1982).
279. Merz v. Board of Supervisors, 147 Cal. App. 3d 933, 938, 195 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373
(1st Dist. 1983); Perley v. Board of Supervisors, 137 Cal. App. 3d 424, 433-34 n.4, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 53, 58 n.4 (3rd Dist. 1982).
280. See Chamberlin, 186 Cal. App. 3d 181, 189, 230 Cal. Rptr. 454, 459 (1986); Carmel-
by-the-Sea, 183 Cal. App. 3d 229, 244-45, 227 Cal. Rptr. 899, 909-10 (1986).
281. CEQA casts upon a public agency the duty to adopt all feasible measures which will
mitigate or avoid the significant environmental effects of a project approved by the agency.
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21002; 21002.1(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). The purposes of an
EIR are to inform public agencies and the public regarding the significant environmental
effects of a proposed project, to identify measures which can mitigate or avoid such significant
effects and to identify alternatives to the proposed project. Id. §§ 21002.1(a), 21061; No Oil,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 86, 529 P.2d 66, 78, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 46 (1974).
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in the face of evidence that the proposed project produced conflicting
assertions, disagreement among experts and public controversy re-
garding possible environmental effects.m The court decided that the
preparation of an EIR was necessary to resolve the factual disputes.2s
3
Significantly, the court noted that disagreement among experts and
public controversy can constitute the substantial evidence which ne-
cessitates the preparation of an EIR.28
In Carmel-by-the-Sea, the court also held that the rezoning of
property is a "project," for the purposes of CEQA, and not a mere
preliminary governmental approval, even where the zoning authority
is not approving a specific development in connection with the rezon-
ing .3 5 After determining that an EIR was necessary for the zoning
approval, the court concluded that a subsequent EIR, prepared prior
to the approval of a proposed specific development on the rezoned
property, was not sufficient to comply with CEQA, insofar as the
rezoning was concerned; an EIR must be prepared at the earliest
possible stage of a proposed project, even if additional EIRs will be
prepared for later stages of the project.2 6 The court further concluded
that a Carmel area land use plan was not an adequate substitute for
an EIR on the rezoning because the plan did not analyze specific
environmental effects which might result from the rezoning.2 7 Thus,
in a major CEQA case, the Sixth District required a public agency
to comply strictly with CEQA's requirements at all stages of the
approval and development process.
In Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. City Councilus the Sixth
District applied the Pacific Water Conditioning test, rather than the
Friends of "B" Street standard, in reviewing the propriety of a city's
approval of a project and an EIR, where the EIR, allegedly failed to
analyze significant environmental effects.U9 In doing so, the court
found an important distinction between a CEQA case in which a
282. Carmel-by-the-Sea, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 245-49, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10; Chamberlin,
186 Cal. App. 3d at 188-89, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59.
283. Cannel-by-the-Sea, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 249, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 913. In Chamberlin,
the court did not reach that issue because it was merely reviewing a judgment on the sustaining
of a demurrer. Chamberlin, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
284. Cannel-by-the-Sea, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 246-49, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 910-913.
285. Id. at 241-44, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 907-09.
286. Id. at 249-52, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 913-15.
287. Id. at 253, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 915-16.
288. 181 Cal. App. 3d 852, 226 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1986).
289. Browning-Ferris Industries, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 865 n.1, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 583 n.l.
See Pacific Water Conditioning, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 588, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 819, Friends of
"'B" Street, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
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negative declaration is attacked and a CEQA case in which the
adequacy of an EIR is challenged. 290 In most cases involving the
adequacy of an EIR, the focus is on whether the EIR sufficiently
analyzed indisputable significant environmental effects. In Browning-
Ferris Industries, however, the issue was whether the EIR was inad-
equate in that it completely failed to analyze two significant environ-
mental effects.29' If the purpose of the Friends of "B" Street standard
is to require an agency to analyze all significant environmental effects
of a proposed project in an EIR whenever there is substantial evidence
of significant environmental effects, then that standard should apply
whether the agency ignores the significant environmental effects by
preparing an inadequate EIR or by adopting a negative declaration.
Therefore, the Friends of "B" Street standard should apply in a case
where the agency has allegedly failed to analyze all significant envi-
ronmental effects in a completed EIR. In Browning-Ferris Industries,
the result should have been an order directing the agency to prepare
a modified EIR in which the agency would be required to analyze
the neglected significant environmental effects.
In the Browning-Ferris Industries case, the court also decided a
significant procedural issue. The petitioner had presented no written
comments on a draft EIR and had not raised any objections to that
document at public hearings conducted by the city's planning com-
mission. However, the petitioner did submit a letter and a report
regarding the adequacy of the EIR to the city council, the lead agency
with the ultimate responsibility for approving the final EIR.29 Under
these circumstances, the Sixth District held that the petitioner's action
challenging the adequacy of the final EIR was not barred by the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 293 At the same time,
the court ruled that a lead agency is not required to respond in
writing to comments submitted after expiration of the period during
which comments on a draft EIR were allowed.
294
The lesson in Browning-Ferris Industries is that participation in the
environmental review process at the earliest possible stage is advisable,
but not necessary. A party can attack the sufficiency of an EIR in
court, so long as the party has appeared before the agency charged
with final approval of the EIR. However, a party may waive certain
290. Browning-Ferris Industries, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 865 n.1, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 583 n.1.
291. Id. at 865-66, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
292. Id. at 860, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 862, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
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grounds for challenging an agency's compliance with CEQA, such as
the adequacy of responses to written comments on a draft EIR, if
the party has not timely participated in the environmental review
process.
The Sixth District published one important non-CEQA case in the
area of environmental law. In Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz,295
a landowner and a county entered into an agreement, pursuant to
the Williamson Act, 296 whereby the use of certain land would be
restricted to agricultural and compatible uses at a time when the
applicable zoning allowed all agricultural uses (including the construc-
tion of accessory buildings) without a permit. The court held that the
contract could not reasonably be construed as a promise by the county
that the existing zoning would not be changed so as to require a
permit for the construction of any accessory buildings. 297 Thus, the
court decided that the Williamson Act contract did not preclude the
county from enacting and enforcing more restrictive zoning to con-
form to the California Coastal Act. 298 If the contract were interpreted
so as to impose a restriction on the county's power to rezone the
property, the contract would constitute an invalid attempt by the
county to relinquish its future right to exercise the police power. 299
Thus, the court properly disapproved the landowner's attempt to
invalidate the Coastal Act, insofar as it impaired a landowner's
Williamson Act contract.
In its enviromental law cases, the Sixth District has shown that it
will enforce CEQA to the maximum extent possible. The court has
adopted the liberal Friends of "B" Street standard of review of an
agency's decision to issue a negative declaration. It has determined
that public controversy and disagreement among experts regarding
the effects of a proposed project can constitute substantial evidence
that a project may have significant environmental effects, necessitating
the preparation of an EIR. Finally, the court will not shy away from
295. 179 Cal. App. 3d 814, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1986), cert. den., 479 U.S. 803 (1986).
296. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51298 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). Under a Williamson
Act contract between a city or county and the owner of agricultural land, the land owner
agrees to restrict the use of his or her property to agriculture for at leat ten years and the
property is taxed on the basis of the agricultural use, rather than the land's highest and best
use, even if surrounded property is used in a more valuable manner (e.g., residential use). See
Lewis v. City of Hayward, 177 Cal. App. 3d 103, 108-109, 222 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783-84 (1986).
297. Delucchi, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 823-24, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49.
298. Id. at 824, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 49. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West
1986 & Supp. 1989).
299. Delucchi, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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compelling a public agency to comply with the procedural require-
ments of CEQA. In sum, despite its conservative reputation, the Sixth
District liberally interprets and applies CEQA.
VII. PRO-CONSUMER TREND N CONSUMER LAw CASES
In the four published decisions affecting the rights of consumers,
the Sixth District ruled in favor of the consumer in each case. Two
cases involved application of the California Uniform Commercial
Code ("CUCC").' °° In its first published civil decision, Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Price,°10 the Sixth District held that the notice of public
sale requirement of CUCC section 950 4(3)
°2 was mandatory, and thus
a creditor's failure to satisfy that requirement barred a deficiency
judgment following the foreclosure sale? °3 In a subsequent case,
Backes v. Village Corner, Inc. 
3
0
4 the court reaffirmed that ruling?0
5
In two other cases, the Sixth District likewise strictly enforced
statutory requirements for the benefit of a consumer. The court held
in Cerra v. Blackstone,'3 6 that a car dealer who falls to give the
original car buyer the notice of sale required by California Civil Code
section 2983. 2307 or who refuses to allow reinstatement of the contract
under Civil Code section 2983. 3301 forfeits its right to a deficiency
judgment."' 9 The court further ruled that violation of either statute
gives the original car buyer the right to possession of the car with
the accompanying right to bring an action for conversion against the
dealer. 310 In another case, Donaldson v. Doe,31' the court reversed a
judgment in favor of an auto mechanic for work performed, where
the mechanic had failed to comply with the requirement of California
300. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1101-15104 (Vest 1964 & Supp. 1989).
301. 163 Cal. App. 3d 745, 210 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1985).
302. Section 9504(3) requires publication of a notice of sale of personal property collateral
in the county in which the public sale of the collateral is scheduled. CAL. Com. CODE §
9504(3) (West Supp. 1989).
303. Ford Motor, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 751, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
304. 197 Cal. App. 3d 209, 242 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1987).
305. Backes, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 212-13, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
306. 172 Cal. App. 3d 604, 218 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1985).
307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.2 (vest Supp. 1989). Section 2983.2 requires a car dealer to
give the original car buyer notice of its intent to sell a repossessed car, including a statement
of the buyer's rights and the amount necessary to cure the default. Id.
308. Id. § 2983.3.
309. Cerra, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 609, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
310. Id at 609, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
311. 194 Cal. App. 3d 817, 239 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1987).
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Business and Professions Code section 9884.9312 that he provide a
customer with an initial written estimate of the cost of the repair
work before performing the work. 31 3
Although it decided all four consumer law cases in favor of the
consumer, the court hardly showed a pro-consumer bias. Instead, the
court essentially decided in each case that a statute meant what it
said and would be enforced.
VIII. No CLEAR Tl1ENDs iN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
During its first three years, the Sixth District has published three
significant constitutional law decisions. 31 4 Each of these opinions could
generate sufficient discussion for a separate article. Thus, it is beyond
the scope of this article to analyze these cases thoroughly. As the
three decisions involve different areas of constitutional law, they do
not produce any discernible trend.
In Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior University,31s a Stanford
University law professor was discharged for making a speech, at an
anti-Vietnam war protest, in which he urged demonstrators to shut
down the university's computation center, as well as for subsequently
interfering with a police dispersal order. The Sixth District held that
the professor's conduct was not protected by the federal or state
constitution and warranted his termination from employment at the
university. 16 The court reasoned that the constitution does not shield
a teacher who substantially disrupts the operations of his or her
employer. 317 Although the professor argued that the court should
apply the test established in the United States Supreme Court decision
in Brandenburg v. Ohio,31 8 Justice Agliano, in his majority opinion,
refused; he stated that Brandenburg applies in a criminal case, but
312. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9884.9 (West 1975 & Supp. 1989). Section 9884.9 requires
automotive dealers to provide written estimates for labor and parts before any repair work is
performed. Id.
313. Donaldson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
314. See Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 172 Cal. App. 3d 322, 218 Cal. Rptr.
228 (1985); Kahn v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 752, 233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987); Wilson
v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 240 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1987). See also infra notes
315-331 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
315. 172 Cal. App. 3d 322, 218 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1985).
316. Franklin, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 341-43, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 239.40.
317. Id. at 341, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
318. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits a state from
proscribing advocacy of the use of force or of violation of the law unless such advocacy is
intended to incite "imminent lawless action" and is likely to produce such action).
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not in an employee discipline case.3 19 In this regard, Justice Agliano
concluded that expressive conduct can justify employee discipline,
even if the same conduct could not subject the speaker to civil or
criminal liability.320 Instead of the Brandenburg standard, the court
found applicable the six-part test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education.
3 2
The decision in Franklin may appear to turn on the application of
the Pickering test, instead of the Brandenburg test. Upon close
scrutiny, however, it is clear that the Sixth District determined that
the law professor's position could not have survived application of
even the Brandenburg standard.
322
In Kahn v. Superior -Court,32 a professor who was denied tenure
on the Stanford University faculty sued the university and sought to
take the deposition of another professor, who had participated in
the faculty meeting on the tenure decision, to discover statements and
motives relevant to the faculty committee's consideration of the tenure
application. The Sixth District issued a writ to preclude the taking of
the deposition, holding that, in the absence of a discrimination claim,
the candidate's interest in receiving money damages for an unlawful
denial of the appointment and the compelling state interest in ascer-
taining truth in legal proceedings were outweighed by the faculty
committee member's right to participate in a confidential tenure
selection process without fear of compelled disclosure of his opinion
and by the public interest in academic excellence.
3 2 In perhaps the
most memorable opinion written by Justice Brauer to date, the court
determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to discover the votes
cast, the underlying intentions of the committee members, or the
opinions expressed during the meeting on the tenure decision.
32 These
matters, according to Justice Brauer, were privileged under the Cali-
319. Franklin, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 337, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
320. Id. at 341, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
321. Id. at 336, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36. See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S.
563, 569-75 (1968) (analyzing the following considerations in holding that a public school
teacher was unlawfully fired for writing a letter to a local newspaper in which he criticized
operations at his school: (1) whether the communication disrupted close working relationships;
(2) whether the communication caused conflict or interfered with the employer's operations;
(3) whether the communication addressed a subject of public interest; (4) whether the employer
had an opportunity to rebut the communication; (5) whether the communication indicated the
employee's incompetence at his or her job; and (6) whether the communication was deliberately
false).
322. Franklin, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 342-43, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
323. 188 Cal. App. 3d 752, 233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1987).
324. Kahn, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 770, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
325. Id. at 755, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
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fornia constitutional right to privacy; that privilege promotes the
public policy to foster academic excellence. 326 In this case, Justice
Brauer properly balanced the significant competing interests.
In Wilson v. Superior Court,327 a superior court adjudged a county
board of supervisors in contempt of court for violating a court order
to accelerate the construction of single cells in county jails to conform
with a court-imposed schedule. On review, the Sixth District ruled
that the contempt judgment was void because the underlying trial
court order violated the separation of powers doctrine, under which
a court cannot directly require a specific, future legislative act. 32 The
court emphasized that the judicial role in a jail reform case is limited
to deciding whether constitutional violations exist and crafting narrow
remedies to correct those violations.329 Also, the court relied upon the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Rhodes v. Chapman3 0 that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment does not always require single celling. 331
In Wilson, the court of appeal achieved, if not a satisfying opinion,
a resolution of a tense confrontation between two branches of gov-
ernment. Although Rhodes held that single ceiling is not constitution-
ally necessary, it certainly did not prohibit a finding that single celling
is required by the Eighth Amendment under some circumstances.
Also, nothing in the Wilson opinion indicated that the superior court
did anything other than find constitutional violations and fashion
narrow remedies. Thus, it appears that the trial court properly per-
formed its limited role. Perhaps the court of appeal simply could not
condone county supervisors serving five days in the same county jail
which the supervisors neglected to expand and maintain, as would
have been required by the trial court's judgment of contempt.
IX. LEGAL Enucs TRENDs
As in the province of constitutional law, the Sixth District has
issued some important decisions regarding legal ethics, but not enough
decisions to establish any general trends. Every civil litigation attorney
326. Id. at 769-70, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
327. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 240 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1987).
328. Wilson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1268, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
329. Id. at 1268-69, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
330. 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
331. Wilson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1269, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
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knows the truth of the following words of wisdom from the California
Supreme Court's decision in Comden v. Superior Court332: "It would
be naive not to recognize the motion to disqualify opposing counsel
is frequently a tactical device to delay litigation. ' 333 To what extent
may a court rely upon the tactical abuse factor in denying an attorney
disqualification motion?
The Sixth District's answer is that a trial court may consider the
tactical abuse factor in ruling upon a motion to disqualify counsel.
In Maruman Integrated Circuits, Inc. v. Consortium Co.,334 the court
ruled that the trial court properly considered, in denying a disquali-
fication motion, the possibility that the plaintiff had filed the motion
as a tactical ploy to delay the trial, where the hearing on the motion
was held on the day before the trial was scheduled to commence.
335
Refusing to part company with Earl Scheib, Inc. v. Superior Court,
336
the court suggested that a trial court could not properly deny a
disqualification motion on the sole ground of prejudicial delay or
tactical abuse. 337 In Maruman, the Sixth District decided to put some
teeth into the supreme court's admonition in Comden.
In River West, Inc. v. Nickel,338 the Fifth District criticized the
Maruman decision for adopting a balancing test for attorney dis-
qualification motions in a case outside of the attorney-witness situa-
tion.339 Although River West was otherwise a scholarly opinion, its
criticism of Maruman was unwarranted. Maruman did not advocate
a balancing test; it merely stated that a trial court could consider the
tactical abuse factorY.3 40 Indeed, River West travelled beyond Maruman
by holding that a trial court may deny a disqualification motion on
the sole ground of unreasonable and prejudicial delay, even if the
lower court has found that the challenged attorney's representation
of his client in the pending litigation is substantially related to that
attorney's former representation of the moving party.34
1 In view of
the Sixth District's recognition of the importance of the tactical abuse
332. 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
333. Comden, 20 Cal. 3d at 915, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
334. 166 Cal. App. 3d 443, 212 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1985).
335. Id. at 450-51, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
336. 253 Cal. App. 2d 703, 707, 710, 61 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389, 391 (1967) (holding that a
trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to disqualify counsel for the sole reason
that the motion was untimely).
337. Maruman, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 450 n.5, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 501 n.5.
338. 188 Cal. App. 3d 1297, 234 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1987).
339. River West, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1307-08, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40.
340. See Maruman, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 450, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
341. River West, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1308-09, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
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factor in Maruman, the River West holding may set the next trend
for the Sixth District.
In another case concerning ethical rules, Atari, Inc. v. Superior
Court,342 the Sixth District concluded that a potential class member
is not, prior to class certification, a party represented by counsel for
the purposes of Rule 7-103 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct. 343 Thus, the defendant's attorneys in a class action may
contact potential class members before class certification. In drawing
its conclusion, the Sixth District expressly rejected federal authorities
which had reached the opposite result. 4
X. SIGNIFICANT RULINGS ON CIvIL PROCEDURE
While the court's decisions in the area of civil procedure do not
generate any themes, they have produced some important rulings
which practicing attorneys should heed. In San Francisco Newspaper
Printing Co. v. Superior Court,345 the court issued A writ directing
the trial court to dissolve a preliminary injunction on the ground that
the injunction should not have issued because the moving party failed
to establish the probability of her success on the merits of her action.3"
The traditional test for deciding a request for a preliminary injunction
is that the trial court should consider both whether the moving party
will suffer more harm if the injunction is denied than the amount of
harm that the opposing party will suffer if the injunction is granted
and whether the moving party can demonstrate likelihood of success
on the merits.3 47 In its most recent opinion on this subject, the
California Supreme Court stated that a trial court may issue a
preliminary injunction if the moving party satisfies either the balance
of harm test or the probability of success on the merits test.348 In
San Francisco Newspaper Printing, the Sixth District did not consider
342. 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 212 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1985). See CA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucT, Rule 7-103. Rule 7-103 prohibits an attorney from contracting an opposing party
where the attorney knows to be represented by counsel. Id.
343. Atari, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 212 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-77.
344. Id. See Pollar v. Judson Steel Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1870 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); Impervious Paint Industries v. Ashland Oil, 508 F.Supp. 720, 722-23 (W.D. Ken.
1981).
345. 170 Cal. App. 3d 438, 216 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1985).
346. San Francisco Newspaper, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 442, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
347. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 528, 439 P.2d 889, 899,
67 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 (1968).
348. King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1227-28, 743 P.2d 889, 900, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835
(1987).
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the balance of harm test. Thus, by overturning a preliminary injunc-
tion for failure to satisfy the probability of success test alone, the
Sixth District's decision conflicts with the supreme court's standards
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The Sixth District's position has much more analytical appeal than
the supreme court's approach. As the Fourth District has noted:
In a practical sense it is appropriate to deny an injunction where
there is no showing of reasonable probability of success even though
the [act to be enjoined] will create irreparable harm, because there
is no justification in delaying that harm where, although irreparable,
it is also inevitableY39
Consequently, the courts should require satisfaction of both the
balance of harm test and the probability of success on the merits test
before a preliminary injunction will issue.
In other procedural rulings, the Sixth District held that an order
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is an abuse of discretion
if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect could be cured by
amendment, even if no request for leave to amend was made in the
trial court.3 50 Thus, on appeal from a judgment after a demurrer has
been sustained without leave to amend, a party does not waive the
issue of the trial court's failure to grant leave to amend by reason of
that party's failure to request leave to amend. In another case, the
court determined that, where a notice of intention to move for new
trial has been filed before service of a notice of entry of judgment,
the filing of the former notice is the operative event which determines
the commencement of the sixty-day period within which the trial court
must hear and decide the motion under Code of Civil Procedure
section 660. 351 In a different case, the court decided that a party who
appeals from a small claims court judgment has neither a constitu-
tional nor a statutory right to a jury trial at the trial de novo in the
superior court.35 2 On review, the supreme court affirmed that deci-
sion. 353
349. Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan Association, 142 Cal. App. 3d 454, 459, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 108 (1983).
350. Eldridge v. Tymshare, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 3d 767, 778, 230 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821
(1986).
351. In re Marriage of Liu, 197 Cal. App. 3d 143, 150, 242 Cal. Rptr. 649, 652-53 (1987).
See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 660 OVest 1976).
352. Crouchman v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 102, 110, 217 Cal. Rptr. 910, 916
(1985), affirmed, 45 Cal. 3d 1167, 755 P.2d 1075, 248 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1988).
353. Crouchman v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 1167, 1170, 755 P.2d 1075, 1077, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 626-27 (1988).
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XI. APPELATE PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
As in the area of civil procedure, the Sixth District has handed
down several notable rulings which affect appellate procedure and
jurisdiction. Again, no trends emerge because the cases involve dis-
parate issues.
In In re Marriage of Noghrey5 4 the court ruled that it had
jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court's interim ruling on a
bifurcated issue-upholding the validity of an ante-nuptial agree-
ment-in a family law case.355 However, the Fourth District has stated
that the Noghrey decision constituted "an act in excess of jurisdic-
tion," holding that a court of appeal cannot decide an appeal from
a superior court's interim order on a bifurcated issue.35 6 Thus, there
is a conflict among the courts of appeal regarding the appealability
of a trial court's interim ruling on a bifurcated issue in a family law
case.
In another ruling affecting appellate and writ practice, the Sixth
District determined that a consent judgment is appealable if it were
given merely to facilitate an appeal after the trial court's adverse
determination of a critical issue. 357 Thus, a judgment of nonsuit, to
which the parties stipulated following the trial court's rulings on
motions in limine, was appealable.3 8 Insofar as a request for judicial
notice under Evidence Code section 459 is concerned, the court
announced that the requesting party must satisfy the standard set
forth in Evidence Code section 453359 before the court of appeal will
grant such a request.3 6 The court denied a request for judicial notice
of a proposition stated in numerous treatises where the court was not
supplied with sufficient information to establish that the treatises were
354. 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985).
355. Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 329 n.3, 215 Cal. Rptr. 155 n.3.
356. In re Marriage of Loya, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1636, 1639, 235 Cal. Rptr. 198, 199 (1987).
357. Dong v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1572,
1577, 236 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (1987), cert. den., 108 S.Ct. 731 (1988) (following Building
Industry Ass'n v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 817, 718 P.2d 68, 71, 226 Cal. Rptr.
81, 84 (1986)).
358. Dong, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1577, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
359. CAL. EvD. CODE § 453 (West 1966). Section 453(b) requires the requesting party to
provide the court with enough information to allow the court to take judicial notice of the
matter at issue. Id. § 453(b).
360. Whispering Pines Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. City of Scotts Valley, 180 Cal. App.
3d 152, 161-62, 225 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369 (1986).
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accurate. 6' In another case, the court observed that an appellate court
has the power to decide a moot case if the case presents an important
issue which is likely to recur. 62 In a different case, the Sixth District
stated that a reviewing court has the power to order a retrial on a
limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without denying any
party a fair trial as a result of confusion or uncertainty.163 Finally,
on the subject of writs, the court indicated that a court of appeal
can issue a writ of mandate, even if the challenged trial court order
is appealable, where the appellate remedy is inadequate under the
circumstances.364
XII. STaNDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Last, but certainly not least to the appellate practitioner, the Sixth
District has articulated the standards of review on appeal that apply
in a variety of contexts. In the absence of a prejudicial error of law,
application of the standard of review is usually dispositive because
an appellant is entitled to review in the court of appeal, not a new
trial. The Sixth District does not break any new ground in its
expositions of the standards of appellate review. Those standards are
set forth below primarily for the convenience of the appellate prac-
tioner.
When an appeal presents the sole issue of the sufficiency of the
evidence, the only task of the court of appeal is to determine whether
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the
conclusions of the trial court. 365 In defining the substantial evidence
standard, Justice Brauer initially stated that substantial evidence is
any supporting evidence which is not patently unbelievable.3 66 Under
that approach, substantial evidence could be practically any evidence.
The court subsequently retreated from that broad definition. Justice
Agliano has stated that substantial evidence is evidence which has
361. Id.
362. Sweatt v. Foreclosure Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 273, 279, 212 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353 (1985).
363. Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 1607, 231 Cal. Rptr. 582,
587-88 (1986) review granted, 732 P.2d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1986).
364. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 438, 441,
216 Cal. Rptr. 462, 463 (1985).
365. See, e.g., Louis & Diederich, Inc. v. Cambridge European Imports, Inc., 189 Cal. App.
3d 1574, 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. 889, 894 (1987); In re Marriage of Kahan, 174 Cal. App. 3d
63, 66, 219 Cal. Rptr. 700, 702 (1985); Santa Clara County Environmental Health Ass'n v.
County of Santa Clara, 173 Cal. App. 3d 74, 81, 218 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1985).
366. Kahan, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
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"ponderable legal significance;" it cannot be just any evidence, but
instead, is evidence which is credible and reasonable in nature and
which constitutes solid proof of the requisite elements which the law
demands in a specific case. 67 In a subsequent opinion, Justice Brauer
specified a similar standard: substantial evidence is evidence which
has probative force and which is such relevant proof that a person
might reasonably accept as sufficient to establish a conclusion.16  The
court has also consistently noted that the testimony of one witness,
even the party who prevailed at trial, can constitute substantial
evidence. 69
The Sixth District has specified numerous standards which come
into play when the court applies the substantial evidence test. The
court will view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent
and the judgment.3 70 On one occasion, the court even stated that it
will look only at the evidence which supports the position of the
prevailing party and will disregard contrary evidence.3 7' The court of
appeal likewise will resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the
respondent and the judgment. 72 Also, the court will draw every
reasonable inference from the evidence that supports the respondent
or the judgment. 373 Moreover, the Sixth District will not substitute its
inference for any reasonable inference drawn by the trial court.
374
367. Claussen v. First American Title Guar. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 436, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 749, 753 (1986); County of Santa Cruz v. City of Watsonville, 177 Cal. App. 3d 831,
845, 223 Cal. Rptr. 272, 281 (1985).
368. Louis & Diederich, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1592, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
369. Claussen, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 753; Kahan, 174 Cal. App. 3d
at 68, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (1985).
370. Donaldson v. Doe, 194 Cal. App. 3d 817, 818, 239 Cal. Rptr. 801, 802 (1987); County
of Santa Cruz v. City of Watsonville, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 845, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 272; Santa
Clara County Environmental Health Ass'n v. County of Santa Clara, 173 Cal. App. 3d at
81, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
371. Santa Clara County Environmental Health Ass'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 81, 218 Cal.
Rptr. at 682.
372. Id. Accord, Donaldson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 802; Louis &
Diederich, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 894; County of Santa Cruz v. City of
Watsonville, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 845, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 272; In re Marriage of Kahan, 174
Cal. App. 3d 63, 68, 219 Cal. Rptr. 700, 704 (1985).
373. Donaldson, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 802; Louis & Diederich, 189
Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 894; Hewitt v. Meaney, 181 Cal. App. 3d 361, 368,
226 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 (1986); County of Santa Cruz v. City of Watsonville, 177 Cal. App.
3d at 845, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
374. Louis & Diederich, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 894; Claussen v.
First American Title Guar. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 436, 230 Cal. Rptr. 749, 753 (1986);
Hewitt, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 368, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 352; Kahan, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 219
Cal. Rptr. at 702; Santa Clara County Environmental Health Ass'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 81,
218 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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Similarly, the court will defer to the trial court's credibility determi-
nations.
375
The Sixth District has set forth special rules which apply when a
judgment is based upon circumstantial evidence. A reasonable infer-
ence from circumstantial evidence can overcome contrary direct evi-
dence. Also, a judgment can be supported by substantial evidence
based upon inferences drawn from other inferences, even in the face
of opposing direct evidence. 376 In that situation, however, the first
inference must be drawn from sufficient evidence and the second
inference must not be too remote; otherwise, the building of inference
upon inference can result in an untenable and unsupportable conclu-
sion.377 Finally, an inference must be logical and reasonable and must
rest upon evidence and probability rather than conjecture.3 78
Not every standard of review favors the respondent. The Sixth
District has stated that it will accept the appellant's version of the
facts whenever that version is the only one presented.3 79 Also, if there
is no conflict in the evidence and only one reasonable inference can
be drawn from the evidence, the court will reject an unreasonable
inference made by the trial court.380 Finally, the court of appeal will
reverse a judgment when no evidence supports a necessary finding.
38'
When the Sixth District reviews a jury verdict, the following stan-
dards of review apply, in addition to the usual rules in effect when
the substantial evidence test governs the case. The court will assume
that a general verdict has decided all factual issues in favor of the
respondent.3 82 Also, the court will affirm the verdict if substantial
evidence supports one valid legal theory which the trial judge sub-
mitted to the jury.383 The court of appeal will reverse only where an
error likely permeated every claim for relief .3 4 Furthermore, the court
will assume that the jury observed the trial judge's jury instructions.
3 85
375. Louis & Diederich, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 894; Kahan, 174 Cal.
App. 3d at 68, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
376. Louis & Diederich, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
377. Louis & Diederich, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
378. Id. at 1584-85, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
379. Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 641, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 516-17 (1986).
380. Claussen v. First American Title Guar. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 429, 436, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 749, 753 (1986).
381. Claussen, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 437, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
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When the Sixth District reviews a summary judgment, the standards
which apply are quite different from the rules in effect under the
substantial evidence test. On appeal, the court will deem a summary
judgment motion to raise only issues of law regarding the interpre-
tation and effect of the papers filed in support of and in opposition
to the motion.386 Thus, the court of appeal will independently examine
all of the papers, including all evidence submitted by the parties.
387
Significantly, the court will resolve all doubts about granting or
denying the motion against the moving party, even if that party
prevailed in the trial court.
38
The Sixth District has had occasion to state the standards of review
which apply in an administrative mandamus case. When the petitioner
cannot claim that a fundamental or vested right is at issue and the
trial court has reviewed the agency's decision for substantial evidence,
the court of appeal will determine whether substantial evidence sup-
ports the agency's decision, not the trial court's decision.389 When a
fundamental or vested right is involved and the trial court exercises
its independent judgment on the evidence presented to the agency,
the court of appeal will review the trial court's decision to determine
whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence. 390 In an-
alyzing the evidence, the court will resolve evidentiary conflicts and
draw inferences from the evidence in favor of the judgment. 39' The
court will also limit its review to the issues in the record before the
agency.
392
In an appeal from a judgment after the trial court has sustained a
demurrer without leave to amend, the Sixth District will apply the
following standards of review. The court of appeal will deem a
demurrer to admit all material facts which are properly pleaded. 393 In
other words, the court will assume that all material facts set forth in
the complaint are true, except those which are contradicted by judi-




389. Browning-Ferris Industries v. City Council, 181 Cal. App. 3d 852, 861, 226 Cal. Rptr.
575, 580 (1986); Whispering Pines Mobile Home Park v. City of Scotts Valley, 180 Cal. App.
3d 152, 157, 225 Cal. Rptr. 364, 366 (1986); County of Santa Clara v. Willis, 179 Cal. App.
3d 1240, 1250, 225 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249 (1986).
390. Sienkiewicz v. County of Santa Cruz, 195 Cal. App. 3d 134, 137, 240 Cal. Rptr. 451,
452 (1987); Whispering Pines, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
391. Sienkiewicz 195 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
392. Browning-Ferris Industries, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 861, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
393. DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1016, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370 (1987).
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cially noticed facts.394 However, the court will give no credit to legal
conclusions or contentions alleged in the complaint.3 95 The Sixth
District will treat specific factual allegations as modifying and limiting
inconsistent general allegations .3  Similarly, the court will disregard
a general description of an attached exhibit in the complaint, if that
description is inconsistent with the exhibit.3 7 The court of appeal will
also ignore pleading defects which have no impact on the substantial
rights of the parties.398 Overall, the court will independently decide
whether the complaint, when liberally construed, pleads sufficient
facts to state a valid cause of action.3 9 As a demurrer contests only
the legal adequacy of a complaint, the court will not consider whether
the plaintiff can establish the facts alleged in his or her pleading.4°
Ultimately, the court of appeal will affirm a judgment on a demurrer
if the prevailing party conclusively negates an essential element of the
plaintiff's claim and thereby establishes that the plaintiff has no basis
for recovery under any valid legal theory.401
Similar standards apply when the Sixth District reviews a judgment
based upon the granting of a defendant's motion for nonsuit. The
court will review the plaintiff's evidence under the same rules which
apply in the trial court: the court will accept the truth of the plaintiff's
evidence, unless it is inherently unbelievable, and will resolve conflicts
and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
plaintiff.40 If the nonsuit results from the plaintiff's opening state-
ment, the court of appeal will assume that the plaintiff can prove all
favorable facts recited in the opening statement.403 The court will also
consider the plaintiff's trial exhibits which would likely be admitted
into evidence. 404 The Sixth District will uphold a nonsuit based upon
394. Financial Corp. v. Wilburn, 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 768-69, 234 Cal. Rptr. 653, 654
(1987); Frantz v. Blackwell, 189 Cal. App. 3d 91, 94, 234 Cal. Rptr. 178, 179-80 (1987); B &
P Development Corp. v. City of Saratoga, 185 Cal. App. 3d 949, 953, 230 Cal. Rptr. 192,
195 (1986).
395. Financial Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3d at 768-69, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 654; B & P
Development, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
396. Financial Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3d at 769, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 654, B & P Development,
185 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
397. B & P Development, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 953, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
398. Id. at 953, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
399. Financial Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 654; Frantz v. Blackwell,
189 Cal. App. 3d 91, 94, 234 Cal. Rptr. 178, 180 (1987); B & P Development, 185 Cal. App.
3d at 952-53, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
400. DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1016, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370 (1987).
401. Sher v. Leiderman, 181 Cal. App. 3d 867, 885-86, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 708 (1986).
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the opening statement only if the court determines that no evidence
would support a judgment for the plaintiff.405 In any event, the court
will not consider any ground for the nonsuit that was not presented
to the trial court, except one which identifies an incurable defect. 401
XIII. CONCLUSION
During its first three years, the Sixth District Court of Appeal has
made a significant contribution to California jurisprudence. Analysis
of the court's civil decisions during that time period reveals the court's
judicial philosophy, as well as numerous trends. The court's general
approach in civil cases is marked by judicial conservatism, but not
political conservatism. For example, the court strictly construes and
applies statues, regardless of the identity of the legal issues and the
parties.
In tort cases, the court will strictly apply a statute of limitations
or other statute which cuts off rights, even if a severely injured
plaintiff is left without a remedy. 407 In strict liability cases, however,
the court, contrary to the First District, will apply the "consumer
expectation" test-which requires less proof to establish a strict
product liability claim-if the use of the product (and not the product
itself) is within the realm of common experience of an ordinary
consumer.408 Finally, the Sixth District has revealed that it is not
receptive to any expansion of the tort of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing beyond the situation where
a special relationship exists between the two parties.4
Employers are undoubtedly satisfied with the Sixth District's deci-
sions. In numerous published employment law cases, the court has
ruled in favor of the employer in every case.410 The court rejects any
effort to expand the law on wrongful termination. For example, the
court has ruled that an employer's mere good faith belief in good
cause for termination, even if no good cause actually existed, is a
valid defense to an action for wrongful termination. 41' The court
seems to uphold the termination of an employee if the employer
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. See supra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 64-90 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 113-207 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 114-128 and accompanying text.
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presents evidence that the employee could not perform an assigned
job, even if there was evidence of discrimination on the part of the
employer or other countervailing circumstances. 412 The court has
disapproved, under the parol evidence rule, an employee's effort to
establish an oral collateral agreement that he could be terminated
only "for cause," where his written employment agreement was
integrated and had an "at will" termination provision.
413
The court's refusal to adhere to a particular ideological path is
most notable in cases concerning real property law. On the one hand,
the court follows the California judicial tradition to construe strictly
the anti-deficiency laws to prevent creditors-usually large institutional
lenders-from circumventing those laws to obtain a deficiency judg-
ment of money damages, in addition to the real property security
from a debtor. 414 On the other hand, the court has ruled in favor of
the landlord in every one of the few landlord-tenant cases which it
has published. 415 In its few environmental law cases, the court seems
predisposed to enforce the requirements of the California Environ-
mental Quality Act ("CEQA")
416 to the maximum extent possible.
41 7
Notwithstanding its conservative reputation, the court has issued pro-




Given that three new justices have recently joined the court, it will
be interesting to watch the future trends which the court establishes
in upcoming years.
412. See supra notes 134-142, 148-169 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 208-228 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 246-268 and accompanying text.
416. CAL. PuB. Rrs. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West, 1986).
417. See supra notes 264-294 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 300-313 and accompanying text.
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